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MINING THE DEEP SEABED: DOMESTIC
REGULATION, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND
UNCLOS III
Jeffrey D. Wilson*
I. DEEP SEABED MINERAL RESOURCES AND MINING TECHNOLOGY
A. Mineral Resources and Their Importance
As the world's known terrestrial sources of mineral wealth are de-
pleted, attention has been increasingly focused on the untold, vast re-
sources of the sea. Although one can only speculate about the full
extent of the ocean's recoverable resources, it may contain enough min-
erals to multiply known terrestrial sources by a factor of thousands, or
even hundreds of thousands.'
Of significant interest is the presence in the deep seabed of mineral
deposits, known as manganese nodules. First discovered during the
epic 1873-76 voyage of the Challenger, the nodules contain substantial
quantities of scarce, valuable, and strategic minerals.2 The United
States has developed a keen interest in these nodules, especially be-
cause of its near total dependence on foreign, politically unstable
sources for the nodules' constituent minerals.
Competing with the desire of the United States to be minerally
self-sufficient is the desire of the developing countries to protect their
monopoly position as land-based mineral suppliers in the world's min-
eral markets Additionally, the developing countries want to assure
their access to the wealth generated by the commercial exploitation of
seabed minerals, in order to redress the perceived economic imbalance
* Associate, Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Collingsworth & Nelson, Tulsa, Oklahoma;
B.A., 1979, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1982, University of Kansas.
1. Collins, Mineral Exploitation of the Seabed- Problems, Progress and.4lternatives, 12 NAT.
RESOURCES LAw. 599, 600 (1979); Kotz, "The Common Heritage ofMankind": Resource Manage-
ment of the International Seabed, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 65, 69 (1976).
2. Collins, supra note 1, at 604.
3. See Kotz, supra note 1, at 74-77.
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between the "rich North" and the "poor South."4
'The United Nations has become the focal point for much of the
debate on deep-sea mineral resources. 5 There has been continuing ef-
fort, for several years, to produce a comprehensive Law of the Sea
Treaty that would reasonably accommodate competing world inter-
ests.6 Of particular relevance to these negotiations is the general senti-
ment that the ocean and its resources are the "common heritage of
mankind," that its resources should be cooperatively, not competi-
tively, developed, and that the resulting wealth should be spread equi-
tably throughout the world.7
Technology currently exists that would allow commercial recovery
of the ocean's mineral resources within the next decade. The depletion
of land-based reserves of oil and gas and the economic and political
vulnerability arising from dependence on unstable foreign sources has
increased interest in submarine hydrocarbons.
This Article, however, will focus on the commercial recovery of
manganese nodules. These nodules are formed by the gradual precipi-
tation of metallic ions from seawater onto a "nucleus" of volcanic rock
or calcium compounds. These ions accumulate at a rate of only atomic
layers per day (approximately two to four millimeters per million
years), thus making this process one of the slowest chemical reactions
in nature.' The richest nodule fields are found in the Pacific Ocean,
where the metallic ion content of the seawater is high and sedimenta-
tion and ocean bottom disturbances are insubstantial and infrequent.9
Despite the slowness of the precipitation process, a substantial number
of tons accumulate annually, thus making the nodules essentially a "re-
newable resource." This renewability means that world consumption
in the foreseeable future will not diminish available nodule quantities,
even if the nodule beds were being fully exploited.'" Thus, the nodules
4. See id
5. See Saffo, The Common Heritage of Mankind Has the GeneralAssembly Createda Law to
Govern Seabed Mining?, 53 TUL. L. REV. 492, 492-95 (1979).
6. Id
7. See id at 513-14.
8. Collins, supra note 1, at 604; Eckert, Exploitation of Deep Ocean Minerals. Regulatory
Mechanisms and United States Policy, 17 J.L. & EcON. 143, 145 (1974).
9. Eckert, supra note 8, at 145.
10. Collins, supra note 1, at 606. Contra Note, A New Combination to Davy Jones' Locker:
Melee Over Marine Minerals, 9 Loy. U. Cm. LJ. 935, 937 (1978) (outer layer growth of nodules is
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are more like renewable fish and seafood, rather than an ever deplet-
ing, nonrenewable mineral resource.
The submarine deposits of manganese nodules are thought to be
the largest mineral deposits on earth. One particularly rich deposit
covers approximately two million square miles, and the Pacific Ocean
floor contains an estimated one and a half million tons of nodules."
This is a far greater amount than the annual world consumption of the
nodules' constituent minerals. One mining operation alone could pro-
vide twenty-five percent of the United States' annual requirements. 2
Although manganese nodules are found in all oceans, the most attrac-
tive and readily exploitable fields are found in a triangle connecting
Hawaii, Panama, and Southern California. 1 3
In an age of increasing mineral scarcity, the potentially vast re-
sources of the ocean can provide innumerable economic benefits and
can reduce America's dangerous dependence on foreign, politically un-
stable mineral sources.' 4 The nodules contain significant amounts of
minerals deemed crucial to American industry and national security.
Currently, the United States imports nearly one hundred percent of its
cobalt and manganese, ninety-one percent of its nickel, and eighteen
percent of its copper needs." United States national security is jeop-
ardized by dependence on foreign suppliers of strategically vital miner-
als. Currently, the United States imports most of its cobalt, nickel, and
manganese requirements from some of the most politically unstable
countries in the world. 6 A complete cutoff of these minerals could be
11. Collins, supra note 1, at 606; see Keith, Manganese Nodule Processing in Hawaii- An
Environmental Prospectus, 14 HAWAII B.J. 103, 103 n.1 (1978).
12. Crutchfield, Resourcesfrom the Sea, in OCEAN RESOURCES AND PUBLIC POLICY 105, 129
(T. English ed. 1973); Collins, supra note 1, at 606.
13. Collins, supra note 1, at 606; Eckert, supra note 8, at 145-46.
14. See Nigrelli, Ocean MineralRevenue Sharing, 5 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 153, 167 (1978).
Projected U.S. Consumption and Percentage of Imports Satisfied by Nodule Mining in 1985 and 2000
Projected U.S. Con- Estimated Recovery -, of U.S. % Reduction
sumption in Short from Nodules by Consumption from of U.S. Imports
Tons US. Interests Nodules from Nodules
Mineral 1985 2000 1985 2000 1985 2000 1985 2000
Manganese 420,000 560,000 400,000 500,000 95.0 90.0 95.0 90.0
Nickel 340,000 530,000 60,000 120,000 18.0 23.0 24.0 31.0
Copper 3,400,000 5,600,000 52,000 - 105,000 1.5 1.9 8.5 10.4
Cobalt 13,000 23,000 12,000 24,000 92.0 100.0 94.0 100.0
Id
15. M. SPANOLER, NEW TECHNOLOGY AND MARINE RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 35 (1970).
The constituent minerals contained in Pacific Ocean nodules break down as follows: 24.2% man-
ganese, 14% iron, 9.4% silicon, 2.9% aluminum, .99% nickel, .80% potassium, .67% tanium, .53%
copper, .35% cobalt, .18% barium. Id
16. See Kotz, supra note 1, at 78 n.64. These countries include Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Tai-
1982]
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economically and strategically disastrous.
National security is further endangered by the burgeoning balance
of payments deficits incurred to pay for imported minerals.' 7 The min-
eral producing countries of the Third World are forming cartels pat-
terned after the OPEC model to obtain monopoly benefits in the world
mineral markets, significantly increasing the potential of economic and
political duress. Therefore, the exploitation of ocean mineral deposits
will help make the markets competitive once again, hopefully with
worldwide benefits.
Minerals and politics aside, the increasing knowledge and techno-
logical advances being made are of substantial value as well. One need
only recall the great discoveries and developments achieved through
the space programs to see that the potential benefits to the world are
enormous. The ocean may be the earth's last great frontier.
B. Deep-Sea Mining Technology
1. Methods of Nodule Recovery
Deep seabed mining technology has dramatically advanced over
the last decade and the requisite technology now exists to commercially
exploit the deep-sea nodule deposits. This technology is predominantly
owned by five private international consortia,"8 thus the details of the
methods are not readily available.
Three methods of nodule recovery are proposed. The first method
employs a pneumatic lift device that functions like a giant vacuum
wan, Cuba, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Mexico, Morocco, Nic-
aragua, New Caledonia, Peru, Philippines, South Korea, Trinidad-Tobago, Uganda, Zaire, and
Zambia. Id
17. See Murphy, The Politics of Manganese Nodules: International Considerations and Do-
mestic Legislation, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 531, 534 (1979). The balance of payments deficit for
imports of the nodules' constituent minerals was $1.5 billion in 1976. Id
18. The five consortia are:
1. Kennecott Copper Corp. (USA), includes Noranda (Canada); British Petroleum
(UK); Mitsubishi (Japan).
2. Ocean Mining Associates, owned jointly by U.S. Steel Corp., Union Miniere
(Belgium); Sun Oil Company (USA). This group does business as Deep Sea Ventures,
Inc. (USA).
3. Ocean Minerals Co., includes Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (USA); Billiton
B.V. & Royal Bos Kalis Westminster Group N.V. (Netherlands).
4. Ocean Management, Inc., owned by INCO, Ltd. (Canada); SEDCO, Inc.
(USA); AMR Group (W. Germany); DOMCO (group of 23 companies led by Sumitomo
of Japan).
5. CLB Consortium, includes Phelps Dodge Corp. (USA); CNEXO (France);
DOMCO (Japan); INCO (Canada); AMR Group (W. Germany); Broken Hill Proprie-
tary Co., Ltd. (Australia).
Keith, supra note 11, at 103-05 n.3.
[Vol. 18:207
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cleaner, sucking the nodules up to the surface ship. 19 The second
method utilizes a central, stationary base placed on the ocean floor with
an attached rotating arm fitted to a moveable carriage that, moving in
and out along the arm, acts as a dredge.20 The nodules are crushed
within the base and pumped to the surface ship; the entire system is
relocated when the nodules within the base's radius are collected.2 1
The third method involves the use of a line to which specially designed
buckets are attached at specific intervals z. 2  This line forms a loop that
passes through the bow and stem of a surface ship, with the bottom end
of the loop touching the ocean floor. The buckets scoop up the nodules
in the ship's path as the ship moves about laterally over the nodule
field.23
2. Economic Factors of Deep-Sea Mining
Given the enormous quantities of capital investment required to
mine the deep seabed, extensive exploration and examinations are re-
quired to discover whether any particular nodule deposit can be eco-
nomically mined with any specific recovery technique over any given
period of time.24 One of the threshold economic criteria is the nodule
composition within the deposit selected for exploitation. The nodules'
physical characteristics vary considerably from deposit to deposit, and
even within the deposit itself.25
Another significant factor is the abundance and distribution of
nodules within the selected deposit. This factor not only determines
19. Eckert, supra note 8, at 147-48.




24. The most relevant general factors in the decision-making process are the ore grade of the
nodule deposit; the areal extent of the deposit; nodule concentration per square foot within the
deposit; the depth, topography, and sediment condition on the ocean floor; the weather conditions
on the ocean surface; the distance between the mining site and the onshore processing plant (this
factor's importance will diminish as the mining, processing, and environmental protection tech-
nology develops to safely allow on-site processing); the nature of the miner's rights; and the nature
of the regulatory regime governing both mining and environmental protection. Substantial altera-
tions in any of these factors will increase or decrease the economic attractiveness of exploiting any
given nodule deposit. Id at 146, 164-65.
25. Nodule fields near the continents generally have a rich iron content, fields in the central
ocean regions have a rich cobalt content, and fields near the equator are rich in copper and nickel.
Collins, supra note I, at 606. Currently, only nodules with combined copper and nickel assays of
at least 2,% are deemed economical to exploit. However, assays may vary by as much as a factor of
two within any given deposit, creating the problem that a substantial portion of the ore contained
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the viability of the decision to exploit the selected deposit, but will de-
termine the type of recovery technology selected as well. Nodule de-
posits do not generally occur in broad, continuous, readily exploitable
fields, but rather in irregular patches, with the concentration of nodules
per square foot varying dramatically over short distances. The richest
deposits are not found on the smooth, spacious ocean floor areas most
suitable for dredging, but rather occur in regions of canyons and hills
of changing slope and undulation where dredges could not operate
without risk.26 Thus, the nature of the technology chosen will affect the
economics of nodule mining. None of the existing technologies are ca-
pable of mining all of the nodules in a given field. An estimated one-
third to one-half of the nodules will most likely be unharvested in any
given field. The most likely response of the mining concerns to allevi-
ate these particular economic impediments will be either to tailor the
mining equipment to the nature of the deposit or to tailor the locations
to the recovery technique employed.27
3. Investment Protection Under Domestic Law
The deep seabed mining industry has long sought legislation pro-
viding for any losses occasioned by the ratification and implementation
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea Con-
vention (UNCLOS III).2 Significantly, the Deep Seabed Hard Min-
eral Resources Act of 1980 (Act) neither protects "grandfathered"
rights nor establishes any legal or moral obligation for the government
to compensate investors for any impairment of their investment's value
that may result from the Convention's ratification.2 9
Substantial investment capital is required to invest in mining and
processing technology. Approximately $650 million is required to con-
26. Eckert, supra note 8, at 147.
27. Id at 146-49.
28. Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Draft Convention, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3 (1980), reprintedin 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1131 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Draft Convention]. In 1978, the industry specifically proposed that the government
insure investors on a per site basis to cover treaty-related losses up to $350 million or up to 90% of
the investment, whichever amount was smaller. However, the Carter Administration strongly op-
posed this effort and the proposal was subsequently deleted from the then-existing draft of the Act.
Miller & Delehant, Deep Seabed Mining, Government Guaranteed Financing under the Martime
Aids of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as an Alternative to Treaty-Related Loss Compensation, 11
J. MAR. L. & COM. 453, 454 (1980).
29. Obligations of the United States are expressly disclaimed in 30 U.S.C. § 1444 (Supp. IV
1980). However, Congress recognized the possible need to protect existing rights and compensate
investors, and accordingly directed the Administrator to propose methods by which these needs
might be met. Id §§ 1442-1443.
[Vol. 18:207
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struct a full size on-shore processing plant, and approximately $350
million is necessary to purchase the ocean mining system.30  Start-up
investment costs are thus approximately $1 billion, while the expected
income from the sale of copper, nickel, and cobalt is about $260 million
per year.
These large sums are not, however, wholly unprotected. The Act
requires that at least one United States documented vessel be used in
deep-sea mining operations and that the vessels be used in an essential
service in foreign trade and commerce.32 By satisfying these require-
ments, the investor qualifies for all governmental maritime subsidies.33
Three forms of assistance are available. First, the investor may
utilize the "construction differential subsidy" (CDS), which requires
the federal government to pay the difference between the costs of con-
structing ships in American rather than in foreign shipyards.34  The
CDS thus provides at least indirect investment protection by signifi-
cantly reducing the amount of investment capital at risk in complying
with the domestic-built vessel requirement. Second, the investor may
utilize the "operating differential subsidy" (ODS), which requires the
federal government to pay the difference between certain costs of oper-
ating vessels under a United States flag as opposed to under a foreign
flag. 35 This subsidy helps to compensate for the higher domestic regu-
latory and labor costs. Finally, tax deferrals through the use of a "capi-
tal construction fund" (CCF),3 6 coupled with the federal government's
financial guarantees under title XI of the Merchant Marine Act,37 will
also enable the investor to lessen the amount of investment capital at
risk.38
30. Deep Seabed Mineral Resources Act: Joint Hearings on S, 493 Before the Subcomm. on
Energy Resources and Materials Production of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources
and the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 273 (1979).
These cost determinations do not include the accompanying maintenance and operations costs,
the construction costs of the special mining vessels, the license and permit application fees, and the
environmental impact statements and regulatory expenses involved. See id
31. Id
32. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1412(c) (Supp. IV 1980). Ships engaged in deep seabed mining are
deemed to be used in an essential service in United States foreign trade and commerce. Id
§ 1412(c)(4).
33. Miller & Delehant, supra note 28, at 454.
34. Id at 454, 471 n.106; see 46 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1161 (1976), as amended by 46 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1151-1161 (West Supp. 1982).
35. Miller & Delehant, supra note 28, at 471 n.107; see 46 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1176, 1178-1183
(1976), as amended by 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1171-1176, 1178-1183 (West Supp. 1982).
36. 46 U.S.C. § 1177 (1976 & West Supp. 1982).
37. Id. §§ 1271-1280 (1976 & West Supp. 1982).
38. Miller & Delehant, supra note 28, at 471.
1982]
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There is no apparent legal impediment to the use of these mari-
time aids in the deep seabed mining context. Thus, if title XI can be
used to guarantee financing for recovery, transportation, and process-
ing vessels, the investment capital at risk would only be twelve and a
half percent of the actual cost for transportation and processing vessels,
and twenty-five percent of the actual cost for recovery vessels. To the
extent the equity in these vessels is funded through the withdrawal of
tax-deferred funds from a CCF, the effective cost of such equity is re-
duced by one-half. Further benefits include investment tax credits and
accelerated depreciation for United States documented vessels, and
guarantees in title XI covering defaults in payments of principal and
interest.39
These programs and maritime aids enable the investor to signifi-
cantly reduce the amount of capital at risk, albeit indirectly. These
financial aids are of substantial importance indeed because deep sea-
bed mining vessels must be specially designed or modified for that ac-
tivity. The most direct benefit to the investor would be realized by
establishing a separate corporation, with its assets limited to deep sea-
bed mining vessels, and financing these vessels with one or more of the
above programs. By this approach, a substantial portion of the initial
investment would be subsidized by the federal government.
II. REGULATORY REGIME FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
A. Environmental Impacts
Environmental hazards associated with first-generation deep sea-
bed mining remain largely conjectural because no full-scale operation
exists from which environmental impact evidence can be adduced.
Several federal agencies are statutorily charged with assessing the envi-
Under Title XI, a United States citizen may obtain a guarantee of debt incurred to
finance a new vessel built in, and documented under, the laws of the United States. The
maximum guarantee is 87-1/2% of the actual cost of the vessel (75% for certain types of
vessels or vessels built with CDS). If the owner of the vessel has in existence or estab-
lishes a CCF, then tax deferred earnings from the owner's other vessels may be used to
pay for the construction of the new vessel, and earnings from those vessels and/or the
new vessel may be used to retire the debt incurred to finance the new vessel. Thus, the
combination of these two programs allows one to build a new vessel using Title XI
guaranteed financing for the debt and tax-deferred funds from a CCF to fund the re-
quired equity and amortize the debt.
Id at 471-72 (footnotes omitted). The government subsidized cost of construction (CDS) men-
tioned by Miller & Delehant is found at 46 U.S.C. §§ 1159, 1273(c), 1274(b)(2) (1976), as amended
by 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1159, 1273(c), 1274(b)(2) (West Supp. 1982). The similarly mentioned CCF
used to retire debt incurred to finance the new vessel's construction is found at Id § 1177.
39. Miller & Delehant, supra note 28, at 472-73.
[Vol. 18:207
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss2/2
MINING THE DEEP SEABED
ronmental impact on ocean areas of private exploration and recovery.4°
In addition, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 41 requires
the preparation of an environmental impact statement for major fed-
eral actions "significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment.' 42 Recognizing the need for an environmental data base to meet
NEPA requirements, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration (NOAA) initiated a comprehensive five-year (1975-80) Deep
Ocean Mining Environmental Study (DOMES) at three sites within the
area of maximum commercial interest.43 DOMES had three
objectives:'
1. To establish environmental (i.e., biological, geological,
physical, and chemical) baselines in areas representative of
selected environmental situations likely to be encountered
during mining.
2. To develop predictive capabilities concerning the envi-
ronmental effects of nodule recovery.
3. To help develop an information base to be used in pre-
paring environmental guidelines for industry and
government.45
The DOMES project examined five types of activity: mining, nod-
ule transfer, offshore processing, offshore support activities, and off-
shore waste disposal.
1. Mining
Environmental concerns surrounding mining operations involve
both the nodule collector's contact with the ocean floor, and the sedi-
40. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), in consultation with
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other appropriate agencies, is required to study
the marine environment and, if necessary, to prepare and publish a programmatic environmental
impact statement (PEIS) "assess[ing] the environmental impacts of exploration and commercial
recovery" in areas where commercial exploration and recovery are permitted by the statute. 30
U.S.C. § 1419(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
42. Id § 4332(2)(C).
43. 1 OFFICE OF OCEAN MINERALS & ENERGY, NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AD-
MIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DEEP SEABED MINING: FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACT STATEMENT 17-18 (Sept. 1981) [hereinafter cited as NOAA-PEIS]. Each site selected
was "representative of a peculiar set of environmental conditions likely to be encountered in min-
ing." Id at 18. Site selection was based "on the need to characterize the range of environmental
variability in the region, with particular emphasis given to biological productivity." Id
44. In 1980, Congress ordered the NOAA to "expand and accelerate" the DOMES program
to further assist in licensing procedures and PEIS preparation. 30 U.S.C. § 1419(a)(1), (b)-(d)
(Supp. IV 1980).
45. NOAA-PEIS, supra note 43, at 17-18.
1982]
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ment discharge plumes resulting from nodule extraction. Although
collector heads cut only slightly into the seabed, some destruction of
marine life is inevitable, as is the release of sediment at various points
in the water column.46
Impact on the Ocean Floor. Although the depths at which nodules
occur typically are areas of low macrobiological activity, benthic (bot-
tom-dwelling) organisms in the dredge head's path certainly will be de-
stroyed. Macrobenthic organisms modify the physical and chemical
properties of ocean sediments, although their precise role in the marine
food chain is virtually unknown. Their reproductive cycle is very slow
and their ability to repopulate mined areas also is unknown.47 How-
ever, microbenthic organisms, such as protozoans, microbes, and bacte-
ria, release plant nutrients into the ecosystem and convert detritus and
dissolved organic material into particulates used by larger organisms. 4 8
Further, the nodules themselves are habitats for various microbenthic
organisms.49
Still, a significant risk is posed by bottom sediment disturbances
great enough to disrupt the chemical and absorptive equilibrium be-
tween the ocean floor and the water column. The equilibrium may
take decades to reestablish, the nutrient level of the water may de-
crease, and the rate of nodule formation may be impaired by the de-
struction of microbenthic organisms. However, the DOMES project, in
compiling the data used to formulate the programmatic environmental
impact statement (PEIS), monitored the environmental effects of pilot-
scale mining operations conducted by two deep seabed mining consor-
tia and concluded that there were no potentially catastrophic adverse
effects. 50
Impact on the Water Column. Both economically and ecologically,
46. Kotz, supra note 1, at 81.
47. Id at 82.
48. Id at 83. The bacterial activity triggers high nutrient levels as well, and some of the
world's richest fisheries are located where the nutrient-rich, deep ocean water wells to the surface.
Id
49. mhese microbes. . . appear to play a significant role in the development of the
nodules. Certain bacteria oxidize the manganous ion to an insoluble tetravalent state,
which ion then precipitates onto the growing nodule; the resultant manganese oxide then
acts as a scavenger, attracting other cationic components of nodules, such as iron, cop-
per, cobalt, and nickel, which are known to adsorb strongly on manganese oxide.
Id (footnote omitted).
50. NOAA-PEIS, smupra note 43, at 61-62, 66. The benthic plumes raised by the dredge head
settled rapidly. Id at 62.
[Vol. 18:207
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss2/2
MINING THE DEEP SEABED
the greatest technical problem lies in minimizing the amount of sedi-
ment discharged into the water column. This is the area where the en-
vironmental impact of nodule extraction could be extremely
damaging."
Nodules are often found in red clay deposits, which form the finest
of all ocean sediments. Given its size, this sediment could remain sus-
pended almost indefinitely and may turn the ocean mining areas a red-
dish brown hue. Along with being undesirable from an aesthetic
standpoint, the sediment could also interfere with light penetration into
the euphotic zone (the upper 100 meters of the water column). Light
entering the euphotic zone is utilized through photosynthesis by plants
to begin the marine food cycle upon which all other sea life depends. 2
While monitoring surface discharge from a pilot mining ship,
DOMES tests revealed that the sediment unavoidably dredged to the
surface actually settled more rapidly than expected, suggesting that the
particles agglomerate and sink rapidly along with the cold bottom
water. The concentration of particulates near the surface was so low
after five hours that the discharge plume was no longer instrumentally
detectable. 3
All of the currently existing mining systems are designed to sepa-
rate the nodules from surrounding sediment. The bucket system works
best because the finer sediment is washed out of the buckets as they
rise.54 However, the pumping systems will raise a substantial amount
of sediment through conduits to the surface ship unless special trap
valves are installed along the pipeline.55
The quantities of sediment raised will have a significant impact on
the feasibility of a given mining operation for two primary reasons.
First, large amounts of sediment will strain the mining machinery, in-
creasing repair costs and decreasing the efficiency of its operation and
its useful life.56 Second, because the dangers of sedimentary discharge
into the water column are potentially great, the international and do-
mestic environmental regimes will impose substantial costs to minimize
5 1. Although data is lacking to confidently state whether the consequence of circulating bot-
tom sediments will be beneficial, harmful, or innocuous, the potential dangers are substantial.
52. Kotz, supra note 1, at 85-86.
53. NOAA-PEIS, supra note 43, at 62. The instrument used in measuring particulate suspen-
sion is called a nephelometer. It measures concentration or particulate size by means of transmit-
ted or reflected light. Id at 215.
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the discharges, the sedimentary content of the discharges, or both.5 7
Therefore, the mining consortia's economic self-interest dictates that
equipment be designed to leave most of the bottom sediment in place
while maximizing large-scale nodule collection.
Impact on Endangered Species." Marine Mammals and Sea Turtles.
During the DOMES study, a list of endangered and threatened marine
mammals and turtles that could inhabit both the DOMES and the
prime mining areas was compiled.58 The presence of these mammals
and sea turtles is significant because they either inhabit, migrate
through, mate, or feed in the areas best suited for deepsea mining, and
the mining processes may inhibit these activities.5 9
2. Nodule Transfer
Nodules could be transferred from the mining ship to a transport
carrier by slurry hose, pneumatic hose, or conveyor. The slurry hose is
the method currently favored by the mining consortia.6" The nodules
would be crushed either by the mining equipment on the ocean floor or
in the mining ship, thus facilitating their transfer to the transport ship
via slurry hose.6' No significant environmental hazard seems to be
posed by this activity.
3. Offshore Processing
Environmental risks escalate substantially if nodule refinement oc-
57. Sedimentary discharges into the water column are controlled internationally by the Inter-
governmental Conference on the Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea, done Nov. 13,
1972, 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1291, 1294 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Intergovernmental Con-
ference], although the Convention by its terms covers only the dumping of wastes produced from
on-shore processing plants and explicitly does not cover "[t]he disposal of wastes or other matter
directly arising from, or related to the exploration, exploitation and associated off-shore process-
ing of seabed mineral resources." Id at 1296. Domestic regulation is required by article 211 of
UNCLOS III's draft convention, Draft Convention, supra note 28, and is also currently provided
by the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980), and by the permit issuance regulations of 40 C.F.R. §§ 221-228 (1981).
58. The DOMES study's list of species included the humpback, blue, sperm, boshead, sei, fin,
right, and gray whales; the green, hawksbill, loggerhead, leatherback, Kimp's, Flatback, Atlantic,
Pacific, Ridley, and Olive sea turtles; the Hawaiian monk seal; the sea otter; and the West Indian
and Florida manatee. NOAA-PEIS, supra note 43, at 287-91.
59. United States policy concerning endangered species, as embodied in the Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and the Marine Mammal Protection
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), does not pose a major barrier to deep-sea
mining operations.
60. NOAA-PEIS, supra note 43, at 70.
61. Id at 232.
[Vol. 18:207
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curs at sea.62 Although ocean disposal technology is available, it would
have to be adapted to handle the particular types and quantities of
wastes produced in extracting minerals from the nodules.63 Currently,
the mining consortia generally reject the notion of nodule refining at
sea because the transportation of reagents, power supply, and the long-
term maintenance of personnel at sea are substantial, economically
complicating factors."4 Nevertheless, strong profit incentives exist to
encourage the industry to overcome these problems 6 and such opera-
tions may eventually occur, probably after the first generation of deep
seabed mining.66
NOAA envisions three classes of treatment schemes that might be
used to process the nodules at sea: "1. A minimum treatment to up-
grade nodules by physical means (beneficiation). 2. Partial treatment
of nodules by chemical and physical means to produce an intermediate
product whose volume is less than that of raw nodules. 3. Complete at-
sea treatment to produce finished metal products." 67
The first two treatment schemes are not presently viable options.
The nodules are not amenable to beneficiation under currently known
principles of nodule mineralogy and the installation of a processing
plant or any of its constituent elements for complete at-sea treatment
would subject that equipment to the rolling motions of the ship at sea.68
The crucial leaching operation, normally performed in mixer-settler
tanks, would be particularly affected. Because these units depend on
gravity, even small vessel motions would adversely affect the process. 69
Therefore, complete at-sea nodule processing will probably require the
developnment of new metal separation and reduction technology.
The technological breakthroughs necessary for either beneficiation
or complete at-sea processing are unlikely to emerge in the first genera-
tion of deep seabed mining activities. Thus, the most practicable cur-
rent proposal would be to partially process the nodules at sea and
complete the production of marketable metals onshore.7 0
62. Id at 59-61, 73.
63. See id at 23 1.
64. Kotz, supra note 1, at 87; see NOAA-PEIS, supra note 43, at 229.
65. Kotz, supra note 1, at 87.
66. Id; NOAA-PEIS, supra note 43, at 230.
67. NOAA-PEISS, supra note 43, at 229.
68. Id
69. Id
70. Id at 230.
1982]
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4. Offshore Support Activities
No significant environmental impacts are likely to result from the
presence of support ships at the mining site. Garbage disposal and in-
cineration units, and sewage treatment and holding devices are com-
mon on ships, and could be required as part of the regulatory regime
for older ships. Oil spills would be insignificant because of the small
volumes of oil involved.7'
5. Offshore Waste Disposal
The dumping of wastes at sea poses the greatest single threat to the
marine environment. Efficient regulation will require international co-
operation and domestic oversight to ensure that the quality of the
marine environment is not adversely affected. Because there is no real
intent to process the nodules at sea during the first generation of mining
operations, on-site dumping is not a current problem. However, inter-
national and domestic regulations are in place to govern the dumping
of wastes at sea produced by on-shore processing plants, and could
probably be easily amended to cover on-site dumping when it becomes
a viable option.
International Regulation. The Convention on the Dumping of
Wastes at Sea (Convention),72 to which the United States is a signatory,
recognizes the international importance of the marine environment and
the limited ability of the sea to regenerate itself and espouses the con-
viction that the problem be addressed without delay.73
Articles I and II obligate signatories to "promote the effective con-
trol of all sources of pollution of the marine environment, and [to]
pledge themselves especially to take all practicable steps to prevent the
71. Id at 231.
72. Intergovernmental Conference, supra note 57, at 1294.
73. The Preamble to the Convention in part provides:
The Contracting Parties to this Convention
Recognizing that the marine environment and the living organisms which it supports
are of vital importance to humanity, and all people have an interest in assuring that it is
so managed that its quality and resources are not impaired;
Recognizing that the capacity of the sea to assimilate wastes and render them harm-
less, and its ability to regenerate natural resources, is not unlimited;
Being Convinced that international action to control the pollution of the sea by
dumping can and must be taken without delay...
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pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste."'74 Under this agreement,
the contracting parties are to work both individually and collectively in
harmony toward this end.75
"Dumping" is defined in article III as the "deliberate disposal at
sea of wastes or other matter."76 However, the Convention, by its
terms, is limited to the dumping of wastes produced on land. The dis-
posal of wastes from the exploration or exploitation of deep seabed
minerals is specifically excepted from coverage.77
Article IV contains specific guidelines and prohibitions regarding
the types of wastes contemplated by the Convention. The dumping of
the wastes enumerated in annex I of the agreement, such as mercury,
cadmium, and organohalogen compounds, high-level radioactive
wastes, and materials produced for biological or chemical warfare, is
strictly prohibited.78 Annex II wastes, such as materials with significant
amounts of arsenic, lead, pesticides, and lower-level radioactive wastes,
require special prior permits.79 The dumping of all other types of
wastes requires a general prior permit.8" Permits are issued only after
careful consideration of all the factors enumerated in annex III, such as
the total amount, concentration, form, composition, toxicity, persis-
tency, and accumulation of the wastes. 81
Article V provides for exceptions to the restrictions of article IV
when an emergency arises from a force majeure, endangering the safety




(i) any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft,
platforms or other man-made structures at sea;
(ii) any deliberate disposal at sea of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made
structure at sea;
(b) "Dumping" does not include:
(i) the disposal at sea of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from the
normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea and
their equipment, other than wastes or other matter transported by or to vessels, aircraft,
platforms or other man-made structures at sea, operating for the purpose of disposal of
such matter or derived from the treatment of such wastes or other matter on such vessels,
aircraft[,] platforms or structures.
(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, pro-
vided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this convention.
Id at 1295-96.
77. Id at 1296.
78. id at 1297, 1310. Art. IV(3) permits contracting states to prohibit the dumping of other
materials not listed. Id at 1297.
79. Id at 1297, 1310-11.
80. Id at 1297.
81. Id at 1297, 1311-13.
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of human life or property at sea, or where there is an emergency that
poses an unreasonable risk to human health that admits of no other
feasible solution. Article V also allows the issuance of a special dump-
ing permit for the prohibited wastes in article IV(1)(a) and annex I in
these emergency cases, upon due consultation with any other countries
likely to be affected by the dumping. 2
Article VI obligates each contracting state to designate an appro-
priate domestic authority to issue special or general dumping permits;
to keep records of the types, quantities, locations, times, and methods
of dumping; and to monitor the sea's condition to enable prompt dis-
covery of any real or potential environmental threat to the marine
environment.83
Article VII obligates each signatory to apply the Convention's
measures to all vessels registered or loaded in its territory and to any
vessels or platforms, fixed or floating, within its jurisdiction. Each state
is further obligated to prevent and punish any dumping in violation of
the Convention. 4 Indeed, signatories undertake, through article X, to
develop procedures for the assessment of liability and the settlement of
disputes. These procedures are to be developed in accordance with
principles of international law regarding state responsibility for dam-
ages to the environment.85
Article VIII encourages the signatories to cooperate on a regional
basis, where there are "common interests to protect in the marine envi-
ronment in a given geographical area," by entering into "regional
agreements consistent with [the] Convention for the prevention of pol-
lution, especially by dumping."8 6 Convention signatories are en-
couraged to cooperate "in the field of monitoring and scientific
research." '
Article XII enumerates pollutants from which the contracting
states pledge to protect the marine environment.88 Although the Con-
82. Id at 1298.
83. Id at 1299-300.
84. Id at 1300-01.
85. Id at 1302. However, the Convention itself is inapplicable to any vessels entitled to
sovereign immunity under international law (e.g., naval vessels). Nevertheless, those vessels are
encouraged to abide by the Convention's terms. Id at 1301.
86. Id
87. Id
88. These pollutants are,
(a) hydrocarbons, including oil, and their wastes;
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vention is specifically inapplicable to waste disposal from deep-sea
mining operations, article XII(f) encourages signatories to promote the
protection of the marine environment, through competent specialized
agencies, from harmful effects of waste disposal from deep-sea mining
operations. 9
The international community has thus expressed its concern for
the safety of the marine environment by creating this Convention to
comprehensively establish an international environmental regulatory
regime. The Convention recognizes, however, that each signatory
should construct a domestic regulatory regime to supplement and refine
its terms. The proposed draft of the UNCLOS III Convention supple-
ments the Convention on Marine Pollution by requiring states to adopt
pollution control laws at least as strict as those generally accepted inter-
nationally.90 The United States has strict anti-dumping laws and regu-
lations already in place.
Domestic Regulation. The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanc-
tuaries Act (MPRSA)91 was enacted in recognition of the dangers
posed to the human and marine environment by the unregulated
dumping of materials at sea.92 The congressional policy underlying the
MPRSA is to regulate all marine dumping by prohibiting or strictly
limiting any dumping that would adversely affect the ocean's environ-
ment, ecological system, or economic potentialities. 93 The MPRSA's
scope is broad. It regulates all vessels from the United States and
American vessels from abroad which dump into the ocean or into the
United States' territorial sea or contiguous zone,94 thus probably cover-
(c) wastes generated in the course of operation of vessels, aircraft, platforms and other
man-made structures at sea;
(d) radioactive pollutants from all sources, including vessels;
(e) agents of chemical and biological warfare;
(f) wastes or other matter directly arising from, or related to the exploration, exploitation
and associated off-shore processing of seabed mineral resources.
1d at 1303.
89. Id
90. Art. 211 is set forth in Draft Convention, supra note 28.
91. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
92. Id § 1401(a). This subsection states, "Unregulated dumping of material into ocean wa-
ters endangers human health, welfare, and amenities, and the marine environment, ecological
system, and economic potentialities." Id
93. Id § 1401(b).
94. Id §§ 1401(c), 1411. MPRSA's scope apparently does not affect the common practice of
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ing the dumping of wastes at sea resulting from on-site nodule process-
ing operations.
The Administrator of the EPA may issue dumping permits upon
application. 5 In no case, however, will permits be issued to dump ra-
diological, biological, or chemical warfare agents, high-level radioac-
tive wastes, or any other material which will violate applicable water
quality standards, or would unreasonably impair navigation in the ter-
ritorial sea.9 6 The MPRSA provides for the recognition and acceptance
of dumping permits issued by a foreign state only if the permit is issued
in accordance with the Convention's requirements and under the
MPRSA's provisions.97 The same criteria apply when applications for
permits to dump dredged materials are made.98 Thus, the MPRSA is
more comprehensive and restrictive than the Convention. This fact is
consistent with the Convention's recognition that it was merely in-
tended to serve as an outline that each state was free to restrictively
supplement. 99
The dumping permits issued pursuant to the MPRSA designate
the type and amount of material authorized to be dumped, the location
and duration of the dumping, and any other special or appropriate pro-
95. Id § 1412(a). Factors that the Administrator may consider are enumerated in the statute,
although the statute expressly states that the list is not exhaustive. These factors are:
(A) The need for the proposed dumping.
(B) The effect of such dumping on human health and welfare, including economic,
esthetic, and recreational values.
(C) The effect of such dumping on fisheries resources, plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife,
shore lines and beaches.
(D) The effect of such dumping on marine ecosystems, particularly with respect to-
(i) the transfer, concentration, and dispersion of such material and its
byproducts through biological, physical, and chemical processes,
(ii) potential changes in marine ecosystem diversity, productivity, and stability,
and
(iii) species and community population dynamics.
(E) The persistence and permanence of the effects of the dumping.
(F) The effect of dumping particular volumes and concentrations of such materials.
(G) Appropriate locations and methods of disposal or recycling, including land-based
alternatives and the probable impact of requiring use of such alternate locations or meth-
ods upon considerations affecting the public interest.
(H) The effect on alternate uses of oceans, such as scientific study, fishing, and other
living resource exploitation, and non-living resource exploitation.
(1) In designating recommended sites, the Administrator shall utilize wherever feasible
locations beyond-the edge of the continental shelf.
Id
96. Id §§ 1412(a), 1416(c).
97. Id § 1412(e).
98. Id § 1413.
99. See arts. I, II, IV(3), VI; VII(5), VIII, IX, X, XII, Intergovernmental Conference, .rupra
note 57, at 1295-303.
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visions to monitor these activities that the situation may require."°°
These permits are subject to periodic review and may be revised, al-
tered, or revoked, in whole or in part, if the dumping cannot be effected
in compliance with the MPRSA criteria.'
Any person violating the MPRSA is subject to civil liability.'02
There is a potential $50,000 fine per violation, with each day of a con-
tinuing violation constituting a separate offense.'0 3 Knowing violations
of the MPRSA subject the violator to potential criminal liability t °4 In
no case, however, will any person be civilly or criminally liable for
dumping materials in an emergency to safeguard life at sea. 0 5
To enforce the MPRSA, the EPA, in cooperation with other fed-
eral or state entities, may engage in surveillance and other appropriate
enforcement activities to prevent unlawful dumping.0 6 Additionally,
the Secretary of State may seek international action and cooperation to
achieve the MPRSA's environmental protection and regulatory
aims. 10 7
Section 1418 of the MPRSA empowers the EPA to prescribe an
appropriate regulatory matrix to carry out its statutory responsibilities
regarding the issuance of dumping permits.0 8 Any person may seek a
dumping permit after the provision of certain requested information 0 9
100. 33 U.S.C. § 1414(a).
101. Id § 1414(d).
102. Id § 1414(a), (e). The Act allows for in personam jurisdiction to be conferred under
§ 1414(a) and for in rem jurisdiction to be conferred over the vessel under § 1414(e). Id
103. Id § 1415(a), (c). Mitigating factors, such as the gravity of the violation, the existence of
any prior violations, and the demonstrated good faith of the wrongdoer in attempting to quickly
comply with MPRSA requirements after notification of a violation, will be taken into account in
considering possible reductions in the penalty levied. Id § 1415(a).
104. Id § 1415(b). Criminal liability may consist of fines of up to $50,000 per violation or
imprisonment for up to one year, or both. Id Violators possessing permits to dump may be
enjoined from dumping because of imminent or continuing violations of the MPRSA, or may
have their permits revoked or suspended. Id § 1415(d), (0. Violators may also be subject to civil
suits brought by private persons with subsequent awards for damages as well as for costs and
attorneys' fees. Id § 1415 (g).
105. Id § 1415(h). All emergency dumping, however, must be reported to the EPA. Id
106. Id § 1417(a), (c).
107. Id § 1419.
108. Id § 1418.
109. 40 C.F.R. §§ 221.1-.4 (1981). The proper information consists of the person's name and
address, and the name of the person or firm producing or processing the materials to be dumped
and the vessel transporting it out to sea; an adequate physical and chemical description of the
materials; the quantity proposed t6 be dumped; the proposed date, time, site, and method of
dumping; an identification of the specific process or activity giving rise to the waste materials; a
description of previously-used disposal methods, a statement of the need for the proposed dump-
ing, accompanied by an evaluation of short and long-term alternative disposal methods; an envi-
ronmental impact statement that specially assesses the duration of the effect on the marine
environment and its various uses; and any other relevant information required by the EPA. Id
19
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and the payment of necessary fees."t0 An EPA decision on a permit,
regarding issuance, denial, or imposition of special conditions, would
be made, if possible, within 180 days from the filing of a complete
application. " ' I
If a permit is issued, it must be displayed on the vessel used for
dumping and must generally contain all the information required by
the EPA in the permit application." l2 All permits are subject to peri-
odic review, and may be revised or revoked, in whole or in part, if the
cumulative impact of the dumping has a detrimental effect on the sur-
rounding waters.' Before a revision or revocation decision is made
final, any person may request a hearing on the decision."l 4 The proce-
110. Id § 221.5. The processing fee is $1,000. An additional $3,000 fee is charged for each
application to dump in a site other than those designated in the regulations. Id A list of ap-
proved interim dump sites is found at id § 228.12 (amended at 47 Fed. Reg. 17,818 (1982)),
111. Id § 222.1. Within 30 days of the receipt of an application by the EPA, an applicant
would be given notice of whether his application is complete and what, if any, additional informa-
tion is required. Id § 222.2(a). The requirement that the application be complete is probably the
single greatest source of delay in the issuance process. Within 30 days after the application is
deemed complete, the EPA is required to publish notice of the application, including a tentative
determination to issue or deny the permit. If the permit is tentatively granted, the EPA also must
tentatively determine the proposed time limit on the permit, the proposed dump site, and any
other appropriate proposed conditions. Id § 222.2(b). Within 30 days of the EPA's publication
of notice, any person may request a public hearing to consider the issuance or denial of, or any
conditions to be imposed upon, the permit. Id § 222.4(a). The EPA also may institute a hearing.
Id § 222.4(b). The hearing shall be held within 30 days of the receipt of such a request if the
request presents genuine issues, and, whenever practicable, the hearing shall be held in the state
closest to the dump site. Id §§ 222.4(b), 222.5.
Within 30 days after the hearing, the presiding officer must submit a written recommendation
to the EPA, stating the basis for the recommendation and the evidence relied on in reaching it. Id
§ 222.8. The EPA has 30 days from the receipt of such recommendation to finally determine
whether to issue or deny the permit. Id § 222.9(a). Any interested party who participated in the
hearings may appeal the decision in an administrative adjudicatory proceeding with the EPA
within 10 days of the receipt of the notice of the final decision. Id § 222.10. During such an
appeal, the petitioner carries the burden of going forward with the evidence disputing the EPA's
decision. The filing of this appeal is also a prerequisite to obtaining judicial review of the decision
rendered in the adjudicatory process. Id §§ 222.11 (f), 222.12.
112. Id § 223.1. Such permits may be of a special, interim, emergency, general, or research
nature. Id
113. Id §§ 223.3(a)(1), 228.10(c)(1). Dumping which has a detrimental effect is defined as
that which causes the detectable movement or accumulation above normal ambient values of any
waste within 12 nautical miles of any shoreline or marine sanctuary; an adverse effect on the biota,
sediments, or water column, to the extent there is a statistically significant decrease in the popula-
tion of specific biota species or of valuable commercial and recreational species, or an adverse
effect on the taste or odor of important recreational or commercial species; an accumulation of
solid waste that significantly impairs major uses of the dump site or adjacent areas; or the toxic
concentration of wastes above normal ambient values outside the disposal site more than four
hours after disposal. Id This decision may also be influenced by changes in circumstances relat-
ing to the dump site's management, whether the authorized dumping would violate applicable
water quality standards, and whether the dumping can be carried out consistently with the envi-
ronmental and managerial regulatory criteria. Id § 223.3(a)(2)-(4).
114. Id § 223.4(a).
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dure involved thereafter is substantially similar to that involved in the
permit application process.
The regulations also require extensive record-keeping and report-
ing by permit holders.'1 6 Records must be kept available at all times
for inspection by the EPA and the Coast Guard and the reports must
be made every six months, or as specially required by the permit
itself. " 17
The regulatory criteria for the environmental evaluation necessary
to the issuance of a dumping permit are extensive and complex. The
general rule is that if the applicant satisfactorily demonstrates that the
material to be dumped meets the relevant environmental impact crite-
ria, a dumping permit will be issued."' The EPA also has the discre-
tion to allow temporary dumping of materials that do not otherwise
satisfy the environmental impact criteria, if the materials do not con-
tain certain specified materials that may never be dumped or contain
only trace amounts of other specified materials; when there is a need to
ocean dump the materials and no alternatives exist; and where the need
to dump outweighs the public interest in preventing adverse effects on
the ocean." 9
Paralleling the Convention, the regulations absolutely prohibit the
ocean dumping of high-level radioactive wastes; materials in any form
produced for radiological, chemical, or biological warfare; persistent
materials which may materially interfere with navigation, fishing, or
other legitimate uses of the ocean; and any other materials so insuffi-
ciently described as to their composition and properties that the envi-
ronmental impact criteria cannot be applied.' 2° Further, the dumping
of materials containing more than trace amounts of certain materials is
prohibited except on an emergency basis.' 2' Limits also are placed on
115. See id §§223A-.5.
116. Complete records of the following information must be maintained: "(a) The physical
and chemical characteristics of the material dumped pursuant to the permit; (b) The precise times
and locations of dumping; (c) Any other information required as a condition of a permit by the
Administrator or the Regional Administrator, as the case may be." Id § 224.1.
117. Id §§ 224.1-.2. Explanative reports of any emergency dumpings must also be made. Id
§ 224.2(b).
118. Id § 227.2(a). This is true unless: "(1) There is no need for the dumping, and alternative
means of disposal are available. . . (2) There are unacceptable adverse effects on esthetic, recrea-
tional or economic values . . . (3) There are unacceptable adverse effects on other uses of the
ocean .. d.." I
119. Id §§ 227.2(b), 227.3. The materials that may never be dumped into the ocean are listed
at §§ 227.5-.6.
120. Id § 227.5.
121. Id § 227.6(a). Those materials are organohalogen, mercury, cadmium compounds, oil of
1982]
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other wastes 122 and on the disposal rates of toxic wastes, the quantities
of waste materials that may be dumped, and wastes in containers. 123
The need for ocean dumping will be decided on a case by case
basis, rather than by the promulgation of specific quantitative criteria
for each permit application. 124 If a thorough consideration of relevant
factors demonstrates the need for ocean dumping in a particular case,
the permit will be issued if the adverse environmental impact cannot be
reduced through: (1) Practicable improvements in process technology
or waste treatment; (2) practicable alternative locations; and (3) other
methods of disposal and recycling.'25 Additional regulatory factors
weighed in the permit issuance process are the impact of the proposed
dumping on aesthetic, recreational, and economic values, and on other
uses of the ocean.126 A quantitative assessment of these factors will be
based on criteria such as the percentage of a resource lost, the reduction
in use of recreational areas, and the dollars lost in commercial uses and
any kind or in any form, and known carcinogens, mutagens, or teratogens. Id However, these
materials could be dumped if,
the applicant can demonstrate that such constituents are . . . non-toxic to marine life
and non-bioaccumulative in the marine environment. . . or. . . will be rapidly ren-
dered non-toxic to marine life . . by chemical or biological degradation in the sea;
provided they will not make edible marine organisms unpalatable; or will not endanger
human health or that of domestic animals, fish, shellfish, or wildlife.
Id § 227.6(0.
122. Id § 227.7. Limits are placed on wastes containing materials that are insoluble or only
slightly soluble in sea water, radioactive materials, living organisms, and materials that consume
oxygen in any fashion, and on wastes that are highly acidic or alkaline. Id
123. Id §§227.8-.11, 227.21.
124. The following factors will be considered in determining the need for dumping:
(a) Degree of treatment useful and feasible for the waste to be dumped... ;
(b) Raw materials and manufacturing or other processes resulting in the waste, and
whether or not these materials or processes are essential to the provision of the appli-
cant's goods or services, or if other less polluting materials or processes could be used;
(c) The relative environmental risks, impact and cost for ocean dumping...
(d) Irreversible or irretrievable consequences of the use of alternatives to ocean
dumping.
Id § 227.15.
125. Id § 227.16(a). The practicability of improvements in process technology and waste
treatment discussed in the regulations is essentially a decision based on a cost-benefit analysis, i.e.,
whether they are available at a reasonable incremental cost and energy expenditures. Id
§ 227.16(b). The logical extension of this notion is that the permit may contain conditions causing
the permittee to phase out or cease dumping as these technologies and treatment processes become
available. This consideration thus also becomes part of the periodic review process. Id
§ 227.16(c).
126. Id §§ 227.17-.22. A multitude of factors are relevant here, such as the effect on commer-
cial and recreational fishing in the open ocean, coastal, and estuarine areas; recreational use of
shorelines and beaches; navigation; exploitation of marine resources; and scientific research. Id
§ 227.21. Other factors considered are water quality, human health due to the accumulation of
pathogenic organisms or toxic chemicals, and the marine environment generally. Id § 227.18.
22
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enterprises. 2 7
Finally, technical regulations are imposed so that the concentra-
tion of waste constituents after dumping does not exceed maximums
termed the "limiting permissible concentration" (LPC). 28  Briefly, the
LPC seeks to prevent high toxicity in the water column or the accumu-
lation of the wastes or toxic substances in the human food chain.' 29
The regulations also govern the management of the ocean dump-
sites.'3 Selection of a dumpsite requires consideration of many fac-
tors, including interference with other marine activities, such as fishing
and navigation, and the ability of the water to return to normal quality
levels before reaching shorelines, beaches, fisheries, or marine
sanctuaries.' 3 '
The EPA would be the dumpsite's management authority, 32 and
may regulate dumping by time and rate once it designates an area as a
dumpsite.'33 The EPA also may monitor the site to assure compliance
with permit conditions, environmental regulations, and the applicable
law.' 34 The impact of waste disposal at the site would be periodically
reviewed, through trend assessment and monitoring surveys, and the
use of the site may be modified if the cumulative effect of the dumping
has an adverse effect on the surrounding waters. 35 These precautions,
127. Id § 227.19.
128. See id§ 227.27.
129. The regulations deal with the liquid, solid, and suspended particulate phases of dumped
material. Id §§ 227.27-.32. The LPC of the liquid waste following the "initial mixing" period
(within four hours of dumping, id § 227.29) must not exceed applicable marine water quality
criteria or, if there are no criteria, must not exceed a toxicity threshold defined as one percent of a
concentration shown to be acutely toxic to the appropriate sensitive marine species. Id
§ 227.27(a). For the suspended particulate and solid phases, the LPC is that concentration which
will not cause unreasonable acute or chronic toxicity in appropriate sensitive marine species, and
which will not cause the accumulation of toxic materials in the human food chain. Id
§ 227.27(b).
For technical information regarding initial mixing, radioactive waste, marine water quality
standards, and the particulate phase of materials, see id §§ 227.29-.32.
130. Id §§ 228.1-.13.
131. Id § 228.5. More specific criteria include geographic position, water depth; bottom to-
pography; distance from the coast; location relative to breeding, spawning, nursery, feeding, or
passage areas ofjuvenile or adult living resources; location relative to beaches; waste types, quan-
tities, packaging, and disposal methods; feasibility of enforcement surveillance and monitoring;
velocity and direction of prevailing currents; dispersal, horizontal transportation, and vertical mix-
ing characteristics of the area; cumulative effects of any current and pre-existing dumping; inter-
ference with science, fish and shellfish, recreation, and mining; existing water quality; and location
at or near a site of significant natural, cultural, or historic importance; as well as any other rele-
vant factors. Id § 228.6(a).
132. Id §§ 220.4, 228.3(b).
133. Id § 228.3(a).
134. Id §§ 228.7-.9.
135. Id §§228.10-.11.
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along with the migratory nature of the most commercially valuable
marine species and the sheer size of the oceans, will minimize or pre-
vent substantial environmental damage, at least in the short run. Fur-
ther experience and technological advances may also lessen the long-
term damage to the marine environment.
One final piece of potentially applicable federal domestic legisla-
tion is the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 36 The
RCRA prohibits open dumping and requires safe and adequate treat-
ment, storage, and disposal of toxic wastes.' 37 The Act also requires
conversion to dumping facilities which do not pose environmental or
health dangers. 38 A substantial impediment to the land disposal of
nodule mining wastes would occur if they are classified as "hazard-
ous." 1 39 Presently, it is unclear whether nodule tailings are hazardous
wastes within the provisions of the RCRA. Although the tailings are
unlikely to cause an increase in mortality, serious irreversible or inca-
pacitating reversible illnesses, improper land storage may cause leach-
ing, which could possibly affect the water supply and human health
within the meaning of the statute. 40 Like the MPRSA, the RCRA has
extensive statutory and regulatory control over the generation, trans-
portation, storage, treatment, and disposal of hazardous wastes, and es-




III. THE DEEP SEABED HARD MINERAL RESOURCES ACT
A. The Impetus, Need, and Premise for Domestic Legislation
The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980142 repre-
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Implementing regulations are found at
40 C.F.R. §§ 33.001-.750 (1981). State laws also regulate land disposal of mining wastes, thus
providing extensive environmental protection and regulation.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1976).
138. Id § 6902(3).
139. Hazardous wastes are defined in the RCRA as,
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentra-
tion, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may-
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in
serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environ-
ment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise
managed.
Id § 6903(5).
140. Keith, supra note 1I, at 119.
141. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6931.
142. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (Supp. IV 1980).
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sents the culmination of nine years of congressional effort to develop a
legal framework conducive to investment and technological develop-
ment, while assuring other nations that the United States does not as-
sert exclusive ownership of deep seabed mineral resources. 143 Passage
of the Act also manifested Congress' frustration over the inability of
UNCLOS III to conclude a satisfactory Law of the Sea Treaty.'"
Congress recognized that the existing legal uncertainties caused
many potential investors and miners to defer their plans and threatened
stagnation in the development of deep-sea mining technology. Con-
gress was therefore faced with the difficult choice of waiting indefinitely
for the conclusion of the UNCLOS III treaty or enacting domestic leg-
islation that would allow investment, technological development, and
mining to proceed. Domestic regulation, however, might have quashed
any hope of ever reaching an international agreement. 145 Since the Act
was first proposed in 1971, successive administrations have resisted it as
an impediment to the successful balancing of delicate international,
political, and diplomatic considerations.
In general, the Act was intended to assure American access, on
reasonable terms, to the manganese nodules; to provide a reasonably
stable legal framework (pending the conclusion and Senate ratification
of the UNCLOS III treaty); to assure security of tenure to attract devel-
opment capital; to assure the protection of the marine environment; to
preserve American interests in the maintenance of the traditional free-
dom of the high seas; and to enable the United States to gain some
measure of mineral independence from its current politically unstable
suHpliers of crucial strategic minerals.' 46
The United States premised its authority to enact legislation and
begin commercial recovery of deep seabed resources on the freedom of
the high seas doctrine. 47 The strongest legal support for the United
143. Id § 1402(a).
144. Id § 1401(a)(9)-(10).
145. "The question is how the Congress should act to protect legitimate American interests at
this time. . . .Those interests include the pursuit of a reasonable and comprehensive Law of the
Sea Agreement, but not to the indefinite exclusion of other actions." 125 CONG. REC. S18,547
(daily ed. Dec. 14, 1979) (remarks of Senator Javits).
146. Collins, Deep SeabedHardMineral Resources At-Matrixfor United States Deep Seabed
Mining, 13 NAT. RESOURCEs LAW. 571, 573 (1981) (citing 125 CONG. REC. S 18,526 (daily ed. Dec.
14, 1979)).
147. "[E]xploration for and commercial recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed
are freedoms of the high seas subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other states
in their exercise of those and other freedoms .. " 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(12) (Supp. IV 1980).
1982]
25
Wilson: Mining the Deep Seabed: Domestic Regulation, International Law, a
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1982
TULSA LAW JOURNTAL
States position is the Convention on the High Seas.' 48  The United
States took the general position that, until and unless the UNCLOS III
treaty prescribes a different set of rules, the nodules are subject to the
rule of capture and possession under the res nullius ("belonging to no
one") principle. However, this approach is rejected by many nations,
particularly developing states, as indicated by such United Nations res-
olutions as the Moratorium Resolution.'
49
The Act is interim in nature, clearly to be superseded by Senate
ratification of the UNCLOS III treaty.150 It is designed only to provide
a temporary legal framework for seabed exploration and mining, en-
courage technological development, accelerate environmental assess-
ment programs, and establish an international revenue sharing fund.'-'
However, there is a possibility that the Act may permanently survive if
UNCLOS III is unable to conclude the treaty or if the Senate fails to
ratify it.152
Furthermore, the Act does not repudiate the "common heritage of
mankind" principle, which the United States supported as part of the
U.N. Resolution of the same name. 53 Congress specifically found that,
legislation is required to establish an interim legal regime
under which technology can be developed and the exploration
and recovery of the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed
can take place until such time as a Law of the Sea Treaty
enters into force with respect to the United States. 15
4
The argument most often raised by critics is that, while delicate
negotiations are in progress, this unilateral action severely prejudices
148. Article 2 of this Convention provides that all states have the freedom to, inter alia, navi-
gate, fish, lay submarine pipelines and cables, and fly over the high seas. The Convention's word-
ing is significant because it clearly indicates that the enumerated freedoms do not form an
exhaustive list, but that other unenumerated high seas freedoms also exist. 13 U.S.T. 2312 (1958).
149. G.A. Res. 2574D, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
150. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(9), (10), (13), (14), (16); 1401(b)(l)-(4); 1441-1443 (Supp. IV 1980).
151. Id § 1401(b).
152. Because of its comprehensiveness and complexity, there is some concern that conclusion
and ratification will not occur for some time. For example, certain provisions of the UNCLOS III
treaty may substantially impede United States ratification. Articles 37-44, regarding the right of
coastal states to regulate passage through international straits, would have a detrimental impact
on the United States' submarine leg of the strategic triad defense system. If a coastal state were to
require submarines to surface, their viability as a deterrent and the secrecy of their location would
be compromised. Provisions such as this may be so unacceptable to the United States that ratifica-
tion would be impossible, absent an amendment or special reservation.
153. 30 U.S.C. § 1402. The findings in the Act state that the United States voted for the
United Nations Common Heritage of Mankind Resolution 2749 (XXV) on December 17, 1970.
Id § 1401(a)(7).
154. Id § 1401(a)(16). Section 1402(b)(1) directs the Secretary of State to negotiate the Law
of the Sea Treaty. See id § 1402(a)(2).
[Vol. 18:207
26
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss2/2
MINING THE DEEP SEABED
the United States' position at UNCLOS 111.155 This argument has been
disproven by events thus far, because aside from the expected pro
forma denouncements from the Third World, the latest draft text of the
treaty is essentially similar to the prior one and no negative impact has
been readily apparent. 56 On the other hand, the similarity between the
latest draft and the prior one also shows that the congressional purpose
of encouraging the conclusion of a comprehensive Law of the Sea
Treaty, 57 responsive to the developed nations' concerns, has not been a
sufficient catalyst in hastening the resolution of outstanding disputes to
enable the treaty's quick conclusion.
Although the United States clearly remains supportive of the
"common heritage" principle and considers the ultimate conclusion of
the treaty to be in its national interest, 58 Congress has specifically es-
tablished the criteria by which any treaty will be judged in order to
receive Senate ratification. 5 9 Whether these requirements are met will
be determined "by the totality of the provisions of such agreement."'' 60
B. Provisions of the Act
The Act does not authorize wholesale, ruthless exploitation of the
deep seabed mineral resources. Ongoing pre-Act exploration, scientific
research, mapping, sampling, or the testing of equipment and facilities
may be continued without a license. No other United States citizen,
however, may engage in any exploration or commercial recovery unless
155. 125 CONG. REC. S18,530 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1979).
156. Collins, supra note 146, at 573.
157. 30 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
158. Id § 1401(a)(7)-(8).
159. Id § 1441. To be approved, the treaty must,
(A) provide assured and nondiscriminatory access, under reasonable terms and
conditions, to the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed for United States citizens,
and
(B) provide security of tenure by recognizing the rights of United States citizens
who have undertaken exploration or commercial recovery. . . before such agreement
enters into force with respect to the United States to continue their operations under
terms, conditions, and restrictions which do not impose significant new economic bur-
dens upon such citizens with respect to such operations with the effect of preventing the
continuation of such operations on a viable economic basis ....
Id § 1441(1) (emphasis added).
160. Id § 1441(2). The Act further defines the relevant treaty provisions as,
including, but not limited to, the practical implications for the security of investments of
any discretionary powers granted to an international regulatory body, the structures and
decisionmaking procedures. . . for the settlement of disputes, and any features that tend
to discriminate against exploration and commercial recovery activities undertaken by
United States citizens . . ..
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that citizen has first received a license or permit authorization under
the Act, or from a "reciprocating state," or under an international
agreement to which the United States is a party.' 6' Even permitted or
licensed activities can be immediately suspended or modified by execu-
tive order if necessary to avoid conflict with any of the United States'
international obligations, to avoid any situation that might reasonably
be expected to lead to a breach of international peace and security in-
volving armed conflict, to prevent a significant adverse effect on the
environment, or to preserve the safety of life and property at sea.
162
Further, United States citizens are enjoined from interfering with au-
thorized activity conducted by any permittee or licensee and must exer-
cise their rights on the high seas "with reasonable regard for the
interests of other states in their exercise of the freedoms of the high
seas." 1
6 3
Licensees and permittees under the Act must diligently pursue
their exploration and recovery plans, 64 and comply with the permit
and license provisions to prevent waste and to preserve future opportu-
nities for the recovery of the remaining mineral resources in the area to
which the permit applies. The Act disclaims, however, any intent to
prescribe production controls or price regulation.' 65
For auditing purposes, licensees and permittees must keep records
fully disclosing expenditures for exploration and commercial recovery.
They must also submit any data reasonably required by NOAA regard-
ing the issuance and status of licenses or permits.' 66  Furthermore,
licensees and permittees must allow federal officials to board their ves-
sels to monitor compliance with permit or license conditions and must
161. Id § 1411(a)(1).
162. Id §§ 1411(b)(2), 1416(a)(2)(B). The Administrator is authorized to suspend activity on
the first two grounds without any action by the President. The latter two require an affirmative
finding as evidenced by executive order. Id § 1416(a)(2)(B).
163. Id § 1411(c). Licenses or permits issued shall include restrictions to ensure that due
regard be given the rights of others, id § 1421, and that appropriate safety standards be met, Id
§ 1422.
164. Id § 1418. Each licensee or permittee is required to diligently pursue the activities out-
lined in its plan and periodic expenditures must be made. Id § 1418(a). Permittees generally
must maintain commercial recovery activity throughout the period of their permits. Id § 1418(c).
165. Id § 1420. The Act makes clear that regulation shall not "affect the volume of produc-
tion, prices, profits, markets, or the decision of which minerals or metals are to be recovered,
except as such effects may be incidental to actions taken pursuant to this section." Id
166. Section 1423(b) requires the submission of such data "as the Administrator may reason-
ably need for. . . determinations with respect to the issuance, revocation, modification, or sus-
pension of any license or permit; compliance with the reporting requirement contained in section
1469 of this title; and evaluation of the exploration or commercial recovery activities conducted by
the licensee or permittee." Id § 1423(b).
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themselves properly monitor the environmental effects of the exploring
or mining activities to enable environmental impact assessment. 167 Al-
though the license or permit holder remains liable for existing viola-
tions or damages caused by activity under his license or permit, he may
surrender it at any time.'68 The license or permit may also be trans-
ferred to another United States citizen under some circumstances. 169
Any person having a "valid legal interest which is or may be ad-
versely affected"' 70 by a violation of the Act, by a term of a permit or
license, or by the failure of NOAA to perform any nondiscretionary
duty under the Act may bring a suit for equitable relief.'7' The court
also may award litigation costs, including reasonable attorney and ex-
pert witness fees, but this appears to be the extent of the monetary relief
available to private parties suing solely under the Act. 72
Any person violating the Act or its regulations may be subjected to
civil or criminal liability. 73 . Moreover, United States vessels may be
167. A license or permit holder is required,
(1) to allow the Administrator to place appropriate Federal officers or employees
as observers aboard vessels used by the licensee or permittee in exploration or commer-
cial recovery activities (A) to monitor such activities at such time, and to such extent, as
the Administrator deems reasonable and necessary to assess the effectiveness of the
terms, conditions, and restrictions of the license or permit, and (B) to report to the Ad-
ministrator whenever such officers or employees have reason to believe there is a failure
to comply with such terms, conditions, and restrictions;
(2) to cooperate with such officers and employees in the performance of monitor-
ing functions; and
(3) to monitor the environmental effects of the exploration and commercial recov-
ery activities in accordance with guidelines issued by the Administrator and to submit
such information as the Administrator finds to be necessary and appropriate to assess
environmental impacts and to develop and evaluate possible methods of mitigating ad-
verse environmental effects.
Id § 1424.
168. See Id § 1425(a) (providing for the surrender of a license or permit and for the partial or
complete relinquishment of any right to conduct exploration or mining activities).
169. Id § 1425(b). The transferee, in addition to being a United States citizen, must meet all
of the statutory and regulatory provisions which applied to the transferor. Additionally, the trans-
fer must be shown to be in the public interest. Id
170. Id § 1427(a).
171. Id
172. See id § 1427(c). The rights of any person or class to seek enforcement or other relief
under other law, however, are not restricted. Id § 1427(d).
173. Prohibited activities are defined as including exploration or mining activities which vio-
late a license or permit; obstruction of monitoring, inspection, or enforcement activities of federal
officers; and selling, shipping, purchasing, or possessing mineral resources recovered, processed, or
retained in violation of the Act. Id § 1461. Civil violations carry fines of up to $25,000 for each
day of a continuing violation. Id § 1462(a). Criminal violations carry fines of up to $75,000 per
day and imprisonment for up to six years. Id § 1463. Use of a dangerous weapon or assault on a
federal officer engaged in monitoring, inspection, or enforcement activities carries a fine of up to
$100,000 and imprisonment for up to ten years. Id § 1463(b).
NOAA has power to enforce the Act generally, and the "Secretary of the department in
which the Coast Guard is operating" has exclusive responsibility for enforcing measures that pro-
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liable in rem to secure the civil or criminal penalties assessed by
NOAA, 174 with these vessels and their contents subject to forfeiture to
the United States.'75 However, proprietary and privileged information
seized during enforcement activities is not to be made available for
public inspection.'76
To further the worthy objective of international cooperation in this
area, the United States recognizes permits and licenses issued by a "re-
ciprocating state."' 77 In effect, the Act gives this status to any foreign
state recognizing the same rights, duties, and obligations as the United
States.178  Moreover, this status is the mechanism by which a smooth
transition can be made from the unilateral, domestic Act to a multilat-
eral or regional treaty between all reciprocating states, if the Law of the
Sea Treaty is not concluded by UNCLOS III. Other technologically
capable and reciprocating states can work together to assure maximum
freedom and cooperation in the exploration and recovery of the deep
seabed's hard mineral resources. The Act manifests this spirit of coop-
eration: "No license or permit shall be issued. . . permitting any ex-
ploration or commercial recovery which will conflict with any license,
permit, or equivalent authorization issued by any foreign nation which
is designated as a reciprocating state."'' 79
The Act is transitional by its terms, pending either the conclusion
of the UNCLOS III treaty and its ratification by the Senate or, if that
tect lives and property at sea. Id § 1464(a). Officers authorized by NOAA to assist in enforcing
the Act are empowered to board, search, and seize vessels, evidence, or improperly recovered
minerals; to execute warrants; and to exercise any other lawful authority. See Id § 1464(b).
174. Id § 1465.
175. Id § 1466(a).
176. Id § 1464(d).
177. See id § 1411(a)(l)(B). Reciprocating states are foreign nations which regulate, in a
manner compatible with the Act, the conduct of their citizens engaged in exploration and recovery
activities; which recognize American permits and licenses, and prohibit conflicting acts; and which
provide an interim legal regime for deep sea exploration and recovery that does not unreasonably
interfere with the interests of other states in their exercise of high-seas freedoms recognized under
general principles of international law. Id § 1428(a).
178. See id § 1428(a).
179. Id § 1428(b). The Act empowers the President to negotiate "mini-treaties" or other
agreements leading to cooperative reciprocity. Id § 1428(e). Such treaties would be particularly
important if UNCLOS III fails to conclude, or if the Senate fails to ratify, the Law of the Sea
Treaty.
To facilitate in the designation of reciprocating states, the Act also allows cooperation be-
tween NOAA and the Secretary of State in consulting with nations "which enact, or are preparing
to enact, domestic legislation" similar to the Act. Id § 1428(0.
The reciprocating state status may be revoked, however, if a state discontinues compliance
with § 1428(a). Id § 1428(a). Nevertheless, a permit or license issued by that state when it en-
joyed reciprocating state status may, at the discretion of NOAA in consultation with the Secretary
of State, nonetheless be recognized. d
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does not occur, the negotiation and ratification of a multilateral or re-
gional treaty based on the reciprocating state principles outlined
above.' 0 If any international agreement is effectuated with respect to
the United States, only those provisions of the Act that are consistent
witha the agreement's terms would survive. 8'
The Act does not provide a grandfather clause to protect the rights
of American investors or miners adversely affected by treaty provi-
sions.' 82 The Act clearly states that the congressional intent to assure
nondiscriminatory access to the deep seabed's mineral resources and
NOAA's duty to try, within the bounds of practicability, to protect
ongoing operations,' 83 does "not create or express any legal or moral
obligation on the part of the United States Government to compensate
any person for any impairment of the value of that person's invest-
ment"'84 in exploration or commercial recovery occuring as a result of
an international agreement involving the United States. 8 5 The best
security for investors and operators is recourse to the political forum,
the maritime aids discussed in Part I of this Article,'86 through the re-
ciprocating state status, or by the failure of UNCLOS III to conclude or
of the Senate to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty.
Generally, these provisions demonstrate that the United States has
neither repudiated the "common heritage of mankind" principles em-
bodied in U.N. Resolution 2749 (XXV),'87 nor asserted sovereign
claims over the deep seabed and its mineral resources. Instead, the
United States merely has asserted jurisdiction over,
[its] citizens and vessels, and foreign persons and vessels
otherwise subject to its jurisdiction, in the exercise of the high
seas freedom to engage in exploration for, and commercial
recovery of, hard mineral resources of the deep seabed in ac-
cordance with generally accepted principles of international
180. See id § 1441(3); supra note 177 and text accompanying notes 178-79.
181. See id § 1442.
182. The Act does offer the following directive, however:
[T]he Administrator [of NOAA], in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall make
every effort, to the maximum extent practicable consistent with the provisions of that
[treaty], to provide for the continued operation of exploration and commercial recovery
activities undertaken by United States citizens prior to entry into force of the [treaty].
Id (emphasis added).
183: Id
184. Id § 1444.
185. Id
186. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54.
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law recognized by the United States.'
At the same time the Act specifically disclaims "sovereign or exclusive
rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any areas or resources
in the deep seabed."' 18 9 This clear statement of intent and disclaimer
should be sufficient to calm Third World fears of "undersea
colonization."1 0
The United States regards manganese nodules as being akin to
fish, and thus subject to the rules of capture and possession under the
res nullius principle.' 9 ' Therefore, the disclaimer of ownership relates
to nodules not yet reduced to possession and ownership under the rule
of capture. Thus, a consistent application of the res null/us theory re-
quires that the United States claim ownership of only those deep sea-
bed resources already "captured." The rule of capture allows deep
seabed miners to obtain marketable commercial title to the extracted
nodules, a crucial incentive to mining and development. The United
States' position is, therefore, consistent with generally recognized prin-
ciples of the high seas doctrine. The Act is not violative of the U.N.'s
Moratorium Resolution since the United States does not recognize it as
a binding rule of international law. Further, the Act's specific dis-
claimer of any moral or legal obligation to indemnify investors is addi-
tional proof that the United States is generally sympathetic to the fears
and goals of UNCLOS III. Otherwise, the United States' massive capi-
tal and technical resources could be marshalled to facilitate deep sea
mining and to establish "undersea colonies" so extensive that the aims
of UNCLOS III would be subverted before the international regime
could be established.
Of final solace to UNCLOS III and the Third World should be the
Act's establishment of the Deep Seabed Revenue Sharing Trust
Fund. 92 The Fund is to receive monies collected by the United States
Treasury pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, with proceeds to "be
used for sharing with the international community pursuant to [the
Law of the Sea] Treaty."' 93 Taxes are imposed on "any removal of a
188. 30 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
189. Id § 1402(a)(2).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
191. Res null/us is defined as "[t]he property of nobody. A thing which has no owner, either
because a former owner has finally abandoned it, or because it has never been appropriated by
any person, or because (in the Roman law) it is not susceptible of private ownership." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (5th ed. 1979).
192. 30 U.S.C. § 1472(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
193. Id § 1401(b)(2). Section 1472(b)(i) provides that proceeds generated by this tax will go
into the Fund. Id § 1472(b)(1).
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hard mineral resource from the deep seabed pursuant to a deep seabed
permit."' 94 The tax imposed is 3.75% of the imputed values 195 of the
resource, payable by the permittee upon commercial use, sale or dispo-
sition, or the lapse of one year from the time the mineral was recov-
ered.' 96 The permit holder may elect to suspend his tax liability for
minerals that will not be processed within one year of their recovery,
with tax liability attaching when the holder later sells or processes the
minerals.' 97 Interest payable is computed from the time that liability
first arose until the date of the processing or sale.' 98 Tax liability will
terminate after an international treaty enters into force with respect to
the United States or ten years after the tax statutes were enacted,
whichever is earlier.1 99
The Fund is further evidence that the United States accepts the
common heritage of mankind principle and is acting in anticipation of
obligations under the UNCLOS III treaty. Upon the treaty's ratifica-
tion, the Fund's proceeds will be available for sharing deep seabed
mining revenues among the nations.2°° This is the goal underlying the
common heritage of mankind principle. Yet, this beneficence is not
indefinite. If an international deep seabed mining treaty is not in effect
with respect to the United States by 1990, the tax liability of the permit
or license holder will terminate, and the "amounts in the Trust Fund
shall be available for such purposes as Congress may hereafter provide
by law.' 20'
C. Deep Seabed Mining Licensing and Permit Issuance Procedure
NOAA is the licensing authority under the Act.2 "2 Permits and
licenses issued by NOAA authorize the holder to explore or exploit the
deep seabed in a manner consistent with the Act and the provisions in
the license or permit. These licenses and permits are exclusive and an
194. I.R.C. § 4495(a) (1981).
195. This value is equivalent to "20 percent of the fair market value of the commercially
recoverable metals and minerals contained in" the reserve. Id § 4497(a).
196. Id § 4497(b)-(d). The Internal Revenue Code provides that "manganese, nickel, cobalt,
and copper shall be treated as commercially recoverable." Id § 4497(b)(1). The Secretary of the
Treasury may prescribe quantities or percentages below which the metal or mineral shall be
deemed not commercially recoverable. Id § 4497(b)(2).
197. Id § 4497(c).
198. Id
199. Id § 4498(a).
200. 30 U.S.C. § 1472(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
201. Id § 1472(e).
202. Id § 1412(a). The regulations for this process are found in Deep Seabed Mining Regula-
tions for Exploration Licenses, 15 C.F.R. § 970 (1982).
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exploration license entitles eligible holders to a commercial recovery
permit. This permit secures the holder's right to recover, own, trans-
port, use, and sell hard mineral resources.20 3
The Act restricts the circumstances under which licenses and per-
mits may be issued.2°  The permittees and licensees are subject to regu-
lations regarding actual mining activity.2 °5
If these restrictions are inapplicable, a United States citizen may
apply for the issuance or transfer of an exploration license or a recov-
ery permit.20 6 Each applicant must submit both an exploration plan
and a recovery plan.20 7 Priority for permits is generally established by
the order in which applications are received. This priority is not lost
despite less than full compliance, provided the defects are corrected
within a reasonable time.20 8
203. 30 U.S.C. § 1412(b)(l)-(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
204. NOAA may not issue any licenses or permits after the effective date of any international
agreement if they would be inconsistent with that agreement; where any license or permit applica-
tion would be in conflict with any preexisting permit or license covering the same area or would
conflict with any previously acquired priority held by another person or reciprocating state; any
commercial recovery permit before January I, 1988; any license or permit covering an area which
the applicant surrendered or relinquished rights to, or where the applicant held a permit or license
that has been revoked; or approve the transfer of a license or permit to a non-United States citi-
zen. 1d § 1412(c)(1). January 1, 1988 marks the outer limits of United States patience with the
failure at UNCLOS Ill to conclude a workable treaty, and gives the Conference another eight
years from the Act's enactment as a "last chance" before allowing any commercial recovery by
United States citizens.
205. For example, permittees must use at least one United States-documented vessel in trans-
porting mined nodules to processing facilities, and all vessels used for the actual mining and on-
site nodule processing must be documented under United States laws. Further, land-based nodule
processing must occur within the United States, unless the President finds that this restriction
contravenes some overriding national interest or if NOAA determines that the processing abroad
is necessary for the continuing economic viability of the permittee's commercial recovery activities
and that the permittee has given satisfactory assurances that the resource will be returned to the
United States for domestic use. Id § 1412(c)(2)-(5).
206. Id § 1413(a)(1).
207. Id § 1413(a)(2)(A)-(C). The exploration plan must describe proposed activities and de-
scribe the area to be explored, as well as provide exploration schedules, methods, and any other
appropriate information. Id § 1413(a)(2)(B)-(C). The size and location of the site selected in
these plans will be approved unless NOAA finds that the area is not a "logical mining unit" or
that recovery in the proposed area "would result in a significant adverse impact on the quality of
the environment which cannot be avoided by the imposition of reasonable restrictions." Id
§ 1413(a)(2)(D).
A logical mining unit is defined by the Act to be an area that can be explored in "an efficient,
economical, and orderly manner with due regard for conservation and protection of the environ-
ment," considering the resource data, the state of the technology used, and other relevant physical
and environmental characteristics. In the case of commercial recovery, a logical mining unit is an
area of sufficient size where minerals can be recovered in sufficient quantities to satisfy the permit-
tee's production requirements, allowing an efficient, economical, and orderly recovery thereof
with due regard for environmental considerations. Id at § 1413(a)(2)(A)-(E).
208. Id § 1413(b).
34
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss2/2
MINING THE DEEP SEABED
An applicant is certified to receive a license or permit if NOAA
finds, after consultation with other departments and agencies, that the
applicant has demonstrated the financial and technological capability
required for exploration or commercial recovery, has satisfied all obli-
gations under other licenses or permits, and has an exploration and
recovery plan that meets all of the Act's statutory and regulatory re-
quirements. 20 9 NOAA must then complete certification action on the
application within 100 days of its submission.2"' Throughout this pro-
cedure, NOAA is to consult and cooperate with other federal agencies
whose activities would be affected by deep seabed exploration or
exploitation.2 t'
A further requirement for a permit or license is an authorization
by either NOAA or the President, based on a consideration of recog-
nized high seas freedoms, treaty or convention obligations imposed on
the United States, possible adverse environmental effects, the safety of
life and property at sea.21 2 These factors can cause the application to
be denied or, if already granted, it could be revoked, suspended, or
modified. 13
Exploration licenses are valid for ten years, and may be extended
for periods not exceeding five years each. Following exploration, com-
mercial recovery permits are issued for a twenty year term, "and for so
long thereafter as hard mineral resources are recovered annually in
commercial quantities." 214
Taken as a whole, the Act is a rather remarkable piece of legisla-
tion that allows deep seabed exploration and exploitation without vio-
lating any international obligations recognized by the United States or
any accepted norms of international law. The United States has
demonstrated a prudent regard for the opinions of the international
209. Id § 1413(c).
210. Id § 1413(g).
211. Id § 1413(e). A $100,000 license or permit application fee must be submitted, theoreti-
cally reflecting "reasonable administrative costs incurred in reviewing and processing the applica-
tion." Id § 1414; 15 C.F.R. § 970.208(b) (1982). If actual administrative costs differ significantly
from the $100,000 estimate, the applicant will either be required to submit an additional payment
or be entitled to a refund, whichever is appropriate. 15 C.F.R. § 970.208(b) (1982).
212. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1415(a); 1416(a), (c) (Supp. IV 1980).
213. Id
214. Id § 1417(a), (b). Permittees not recovering minerals in commercial quantities at the end
of ten years will lose their permits absent a showing of good cause for their failure to diligently
exploit. Permittees showing good cause may retain their permit, but only for the remainder of the
initial twenty year term. Cf. id § 1418 (exploration and recovery plans must be designed to assure
diligent development). This requirement prevents a licensee or permittee from holding the rights
without developing the mineral resources.
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community and has accepted the obligation, as a matter of domestic
law,.to share with developing nations the wealth generated by deep
seabed mining. Critics have charged that the United States is under-
mining global negotiations and is attempting to colonize the deep sea-
bed. The Act refutes these arguments by acknowledging treaty
obligations, accepting the common heritage of mankind principle, and
by affirmatively refusing to assert sovereign 6laims over the deep sea-
bed and its minerals. Furthermore, the interim nature of the Act and
its consonance with recognized international law effectively rebuts the
criticism. Indeed, the United States is the only country which has al-
ready undertaken in advance to fulfill its obligations under the UN-
CLOS III treaty.
IV. INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY PROPOSALS: UNCLOS III AND
THE "COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND"
A. Current International Law Regime
The crucial issue surrounding the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Re-
sources Act is whether a state may authorize nonexclusive deep seabed
mineral collection and processing activities. If so, the legal structure
unilaterally provided by the United States to facilitate investment,
technological progress, and mineral recovery is not a violation of inter-
national law. Whether the United States action is justified requires a
brief examination of current international law.
International law has three sources: properly ratified treaties; state
practice undertaken with a sense of obligation, commonly referred to as
customary international law; and general principles of law recognized
by all civilized nations. Of these three sources, customary practice is
perhaps the most important with respect to the law of the sea.
2t 15
215. In re Martinez, 28 I.L.R. 170 (Italy, Corte cass. 1959).
[C]ustom is a manifestation of social life which hardens by means of constant and uni-
form repetition of certain acts on the part of States or individuals, extending over a
period of time, to which municipal law attributes legal relevance. In the international
field this presupposes the existence of a substantive element, namely, the constant repeti-
tion of certain rules of conduct between States, and a psychological element, namely, the
conviction that such conduct is obligatory for everybody, so that others can insist upon it,
and which does not depend on purely subjective judgment.
Id at 172. Cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 n.15 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting J. BRILItLY,
THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (1944)) ("The best evidence for the existence of
international law is that every actual State recognizes that it does exist and that it is itself under an
obligation to observe it."); Burton, Freedom of the Seas: International Law Applicable to Deep
SeabedMining Claims, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1135, 1148 n.51 (1977) ("State practices qualify as evi-
dence of international customary law only when there is evidence that the practice is undertaken
- under a sense of obligation.").
[Vol. 18:207
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Customary international law is oftentimes codified into treaties.
Treaties are of a positivistic nature in that a state is not bound by a
treaty unless it has been expressly ratified.2 6 However, regardless of
whether a state ratifies a treaty, it is still bound by any customary inter-
national law that the treaty may have codified.
The freedom of the high seas doctrine arose from the customary
practice of states, and secured the right to fish and navigate on the high
seas free from unreasonable interference by other states. This doctrine
protecting fishing and navigation interests has been broadened over the
years, especially in the twentieth century, as new uses have arisen.
These new uses of the high seas will have to be balanced against the
traditional fishing and navigation rights, and may result in some re-
strictions thereof. Of particular significance in the deep seabed mining
context is that there never has been any conventional or customary in-
ternational law limiting a state's oceanic jurisdiction. Therefore, the
Act and any unilateral appropriation of deep seabed resources by the
United States are neither inconsistent with existing international law
nor an unreasonable interference with the high seas freedoms.
This conclusion is buttressed by two further points. First, neither
international law nor international practice have ever held that the sub-
marine areas automatically share the res communis status of the high
seas.21 7 The true and sole purpose of the freedom of the high seas doc-
trine is to "ensure freedom of navigation, unhampered by exclusive
claims of individual states, and freedom of utilization of the resources
of the sea to a degree to which they can be equitably utilized by all."' 18
Thus, while the ocean surface is arguably res communis, the deep sea-
bed is arguablyres nullius. Because of this legal distinction between the
water column and the seabed, the nodules would be subject to the nor-
mal rules of capture and possession because they belong to no one until
they are either "captured," or until the UNCLOS III treaty is con-
cluded and establishes different rules. This is one of the Act's underly-
ing premises. Deep seabed mining will probably not unreasonably
interfere with the freedom of navigation because commercial recovery
activities will be carried on by either floating, navigable vessels, or by
216. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) art. 34, 24 U.N. GAOR at -. U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.39/27 (1969): North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1969 I.C.J. 47.
217. Lauterpacht, So'ereigijnt Orer Sublnarine Areas. 27 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 376, 414 (1950).
218. id at 407. The context of this statement would exclude deep seabed minerals from fall-
ing under the rubric of "the resources of the sea."
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deep-sea platforms that can be easily marked and mapped so that ships
can avoid them.
Further, the existing conventional international law clearly does
not prohibit deep seabed mining. Article 2 of the U.N. Convention on
the High Seas secures, inter alia, the freedoms of fishing, navigation,
laying submarine cables and pipelines, and overflight, and creates the
duty to exercise these freedoms with reasonable regard for the interests
of other states.2 9  The "inter alia" terminology of article 2 makes it
clear that the list of freedoms is not exclusive. The United Nations
International Law Commission that drafted the Convention to codify
existing customary international law was of the same opinion.22t The
Commission's statement that "[deep-sea mineral] exploitation had not
yet assumed sufficient practical importance to justify special regula-
tion," 22 however, can be interpreted as advising the promulgation of
special regulations by treaty when deep seabed mining technology im-
proves to the point where exploitation is possible. Until such promul-
gation occurs and a new rule to the contrary is established, article 2
cannot be fairly read to contain any prohibition regarding deep seabed
mining. Indeed, such activity is arguably within the inter alia language
of the Convention. One commentator has suggested that, given the
nodules' apparent renewability, nodule exploitation is a technologically
sophisticated form of fishing, falling literally within the purview of arti-
cle 2.222 Therefore, until UNCLOS III concludes the Law of the Sea
Treaty, the United States is merely exercising currently existing rights
under conventional and customary international law in authorizing
deep seabed mining.
219. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Convention on the High Seas, Apr.
29, 1958. 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200. 415 U.N.T.S. 82. The United Nations Convention on
the Continental Shelf is silent on the issue of resource exploitation in the deep seabed because it
was clearly intended to apply only to the seabed "adjacent" to the shore. United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea. Convention on the Continental Shelf. Apr. 29. 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471.
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
220. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 12 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 9) para. 33, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprintedin 1195612 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253.
278, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1.
The list of freedoms of the high seas contained in [Article 21 iv n1 restricti'e. The
Commission has merely specified four of the main freedoms, but it is aware that there
are other freedoms . . . . The Commission has not made specific mention of the free-
dom to explore or exploit the subsoil of the high seas. It considered that.., such ex-




222. Collins, supra note 1, at 633.
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B. UNCLOS III
One of the reasons for the United States' unilateral action on deep
seabed mining legislation was its utter frustration with UNCLOS III's
lack of progress toward the conclusion of a Law of the Sea Treaty.
Convened in Caracas, Venezuela in 1974, UNCLOS III has failed for
eight years to produce a final draft of a treaty. The Conference itself
has degenerated into a dysfunctional exchange of "rich North versus
poor South" rhetoric and a series of extreme demands by the numeri-
cally superior Group of 77.223
The Group of 77 has demanded that the nations with deep seabed
mining technology transfer that technology to the developing nations
and that the wealth generated by mining activities be used to redress
the economic inequities between the North and South. 224 Furthermore,
the developing nations demand that they be allowed to nationalize
these assets without providing just compensation.225 These demands
are made principally and most vociferously by nations having a historic
tendency of expropriating wealth rather than creating it, and they gen-
erally have no means of either applying the technology acquired or us-
ing the resourses recovered. Further, because many of these nations
are members of cartels holding virtual monopolies on world production
of the nodules' more valuable constituent minerals, they demand the
imposition of production quotas, price controls, and trade preferences
for their land-produced minerals in order to protect their monopoly
positions. The trade-preference demand has been especially trouble-
some to the United States: first, due to America's dependence on politi-
cally unstable foreign sources of cobalt and manganese, which are
considered vital to American defense and industry, and second, be-
cause of the potential for OPEC-style political duress.
From their perspective, those nations with deep seabed mining
technology have made many significant concessions.226 The United
States, for instance, has offered to allow production controls on mining
activities and has agreed to allow the Seabed Authority to operate com-
petitively with American mining companies.227 Furthermore, the
United States has accepted a "banking arrangement" whereby the Au-
223. The Group of 77 currently is comprised of considerably more than 77 developing nations.
224. Alexander, Cameron & Nixon, The Costs of Failure at the Third Law of the Sea Confer.
ence, 9 J. MAR. L. & Com. 1, 21 (1977).
225. Id
226. Id
227. Id a 22.
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thority can use one of the two mining sites proposed by each applicant
for its own mining activities, and has created the legal and taxation
structure to transfer vast amounts of money to the developing nations
through the Act's revenue sharing Fund.228 Despite these almost revo-
lutionary concessions, the Group of 77 has adamantly refused to make
concessions and has used UNCLOS III as a platform for their political
and ideological goal of forcing the creation of a new international eco-
nomic order that they can dominate by their sheer numbers. The de-
veloped nations are willing to accommodate the Group of 77 to a
certain point, but understandably resist attempts to create an interna-
tional Authority not responsive to their interests, especially given that
the successful operation of that Authority depends wholly on technol-
ogy and risk capital that only the developed nations can provide. This
squabbling has effectively prevented UNCLOS III from concluding a
Law of the Sea Treaty. The United States has, in effect, given UN-
CLOS III until 1990 to produce the treaty at which time the Fund es-
tablished by the Act may be used by Congress for other purposes. 229 At
that late date, the United States may even opt out of the UNCLOS III
process altogether.
I. Pardo Speech and the "Common Heritage
of Mankind" Principle
The notion that the mineral wealth of the ocean floor could rap-
idly redress the economic inequities between the developed and devel-
oping nations was first proposed on August 17, 1967, by Arvid Pardo,
Malta's Ambassador to the U.N. Pardo asserted that the ocean's vast
mineral wealth was readily and easily exploitable and would solve all
of the developing nations' economic woes. Therefore, he proposed that
the ocean floor and its mineral resources be deemed the common prop-
erty of mankind, not subject to national or sovereign appropriation, to
be developed cooperatively, not competitively, with the resources usa-
ble only for peaceful purposes, and that these principles be codified in
an international agreement.2 3°
228. Id
229. See 30 U.S.C. § 1472(e) (Supp. IV 1980).
230. N. L..( C. OLIVIER & J. SW|.NIN. Tim INTIRNATIONAL LI.GAL SYS'rI.M 223 (2d ed.
1981). Pardo's phrase, "'common heritage of mankind," was not necessarily a new concept when it
was first uttered. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Senator Frank Church.
and the World Peace Through Law Conference had all previously proposed to vest the title to the
entire seabed and its mineral resources in the "international community" through its agent. the
United Nations. The ostensible purposes behind this proposal were to make the U.N. financially
[Vol. 18:207
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Unfortunately, Pardo's exaggerated assertions that the seabed's
mineral resources were readily and easily exploitable likely misled the
developing nations into thinking that these minerals could fuel rapid
industrial development and eliminate poverty. The developed nations,
however, recognizing the massive costs, advanced technology, and the
enormous risks involved, were shocked by the proposal. Nevertheless,
UNCLOS III negotiations pertaining to deep seabed mining have pro-
ceeded on the premise that the development of ocean resources some-
how requires the preferential sharing of benefits with the developing
nations.23" ' This notion has caused the polarization of the developed
and the developing nations, resulting in UNCLOS III's remarkable
lack of progress.232
Moratorium Resolution. To effect the essence of Pardo's proposals, the
developing nations initiated and passed, over the strenuous objections
of many developed nations, the Moratorium Resolution.233 The Reso-
lution was intended to prevent the technologically advanced nations
from "colonizing" the deep seabed and presenting UNCLOS III with a
fait accompli before the treaty could even be negotiated or put into
place.234
The question thus arises whether this Resolution is binding on the
United States and thereby renders the Act violative of international
law. The United States objected to and voted against the Resolution,
and does not therefore recognize it as a binding rule of international
law.235 General Assembly resolutions are normally not legally binding,
even though they may either restate a rule of international law that is
independent; to avoid future controversy over competing national and individual seabed claims;
to assure economically efficient exploitation of the ocean's resources, to prevent the military use
and abuse of the ocean's resources, and to avoid the destruction of the marine environment by
unregulated pollution. Collins, supra note 1, at 635-37.
23 1. Collins, supra note 1, at 637.
232. Id at 638.
233. G.A. Res. 2574 D, 24 U.N. GAOR Perm. Comm. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1833 (1969).
Canada, France, the Netherlands, Norway, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United
States all either voted against the resolution or else abstained in a rare showing of unanimity.
Collins, supra note 1, at 640.
234. G.A. Res. 2574 D, supra note 233. The Moratorium Resolution declared that,
pending the establishment of the. . . international regime:
(a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from all activities
of exploitation of the resources of the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;
(b) No claim to any part of that area or its resources shall be recognized.
Id
235. Burton, supra note 215, at 1148-50 & nn.51-55.
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otherwise binding or facilitate the development of the opiniojuris, thus
focusing the practice of states.2 36 General Assembly resolutions be-
come evidence of customary international law only in the exceptional
cases where they are unanimously adopted and observed by state prac-
tice.237 Therefore, the Act and activities thereunder are not violations
of any international law currently recognized by United States custom
or practice.
Common Heritage of Mankind Resolution. Shortly after adopting the
Moratorium Resolution, the General Assembly adopted the Common
Heritage of Mankind Resolution. 238 The Resolution provided that
"[t]he seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the lim-
its of national jurisdiction. . . , as well as the resources of the area, are
-the common heritage of mankind, ' 239 essentially restating Pardo's pro-
posals. The United States supported the Resolution by affirmative
vote;240 thus, the common heritage of mankind principle became bind-
ing on the United States. The major issue raised by the Resolution,
however, is whether the phrase "common heritage of mankind" has
any legal meaning and effect apart from the Declaration of Principles
in the Resolution.
Pardo defined the phrase to mean that the seabed has a special
status and is to be used only for peaceful purposes. He emphasized
that it does not involve the civil law concept of res omnium communis,
which would allow exploitation by anyone.24' Thus, the phrase is
probably sui generis, capable of future definition and elaboration, but
it has been criticized as an example of "politicians using legal terms
and creating an undefinable and as yet unworkable concept. ' 242 Most
commentators agree that the common heritage concept is a moral com-
mitment, not a legal one, and that considered alone, the phrase is de-
void of legal meaning.243 While accepting the common heritage of
236. Id at 1148-51.
237. Id n.53.
238. G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
239. Id
240. See 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1980). The Act was circumspectly drafted to reflect
the acceptance of the common heritage principle and to lay the groundwork for the revenue shar-
ing requirements of that principle and the UNCLOS draft convention.
241. Pardo, An International Regimefor the Deep Seabed- Developing Law or Developing Anar-
chy?, 5 Tax. INT'L L.F. 204, 214 (1970); see Collins, supra note 1, at 642.
242. Collins, supra note 1, at 642.
243. See, e.g., id at 642-43; Arnold, The Common Heritage of Mankind as a Legal Concept, 9
INT'L LAW 153 (1975); Gorove, The Concept of "Common Heritage of Mankind" A Political,
Moral or Legal Innovation, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 390 (1972); Saffo, supra note 5, at 513-15.
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mankind principle, the United States rejects the developing nations' in-
terpretation of it that title to the seabed and its resources is vested in the
international community or in any individual state. 2'
2. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea
On the same day that the Common Heritage of Mankind Resolu-
tion was passed, the General Assembly called for the convocation of
the Law of the Sea Conference.245 The Conference was to produce a
treaty to achieve two purposes: to codify existing rules of customary
international law and to create new law.24 6 The former presents no
problem for the United States because it already recognizes these rules.
The latter, however, would not be binding on the United States (or on
any other nation) if it objects or makes special reservations thereto. If a
large number of states ratify the treaty-if and when it emerges from
UNCLOS III-and make their state practices conform thereto, the
United States might quickly be bound to follow those new provisions
as a matter of customary international law, particularly if it fails to
object to those provisions deemed not in its best interest. This problem
might be avoided, however, because there are very few states in the
world with the present technological or financial capability to mine the
deep seabed. Therefore, even if a large number of states ratify the
treaty, mere ratification alone, unaccompanied by widespread state
practice (i.e., actual engagement in mining activities), may not ripen
into a rule of customary international law.
The draft Convention itself can only be described as exhaustively
comprehensive. The preamble to the Convention reveals its broad
objectives, including: A spirit of cooperation; a legal structure to facili-
244. The Group of 77 argues that the common heritage of mankind phrase means that no state
may undertake resource exploitation activities without the international community's consent.
Charney, The International Regime For the Deep Seabed- Past Conflicts and Proposals For Pro-
gress, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 34 (176). The main reason for this interpretation is the Third
World's aversion to anything even remotely resembling colonialism. This interpretation clarifies
the word "heritage," which, although relatively neutral in English, is translated "patrimonio" in
Spanish and "patrimoine" in French, both words strongly suggesting possessory or property
rights. Thus, the Group of 77 wants a clear understanding that the seabed is a heritage owned by
all, not just by those countries technologically and financially capable of "colonizing" the deep
seabed. Because of the wide divergence in perspectives, the phrase cannot soon become a norma-
tive concept constituting customary practice, although its continual use by various states does
indicate that a consensus regarding its meaning may eventually be reached. See Saffo, supra note
5, at 514-15. Under the circumstances, the United States' interpretation of the phrase is as valid as
that of the developing countries.
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tate equitable utilization of resources; recognition of the interest of de-
veloping countries within the context of an equitable international
economic order; recognition of deep seabed mineral resources as the
common heritage of mankind; and a codification of the law of the sea
to promote economic advancement of all the world's peoples.247
Part XI of the Convention is aimed specifically at the deep seabed,
defined as the "Area" in the Convention, and governs all activities re-
specting the recovery of the mineral resources therein.24 Confirming
anew that "[t]he Area and its resources are the common heritage of
mankind,"249 the Convention provides that "[n]o State shall claim or
exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its
resources," that "[a]U rights in the resources of the Area are vested in
mankind as a whole" and "[t]hese resources are not subject to aliena-
tion," that "[n]o State or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire
or exercise rights with respect to the minerals of the Area except in
accordance with. . . this Part," and that "no such claim, acquisition or
exercise of such rights shall be recognized. ' 250  States are expected to
act in consonance with the goals of "maintaining peace and security
and promoting international cooperation and mutual understand-
ing., 25' Each state party is obligated to take any necessary and appro-
priate measures to ensure compliance with the Convention and to
247. Draft Convention, supra note 28, at 20.
The Convention has further codified some of Pardo's proposals by providing that:
Activities in the Area shall. . . be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole...
taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the developing States
.... The Authority [the organization through which the parties to the Convention will
organize and control Area activities] shall provide for the equitable sharing of financial
and other economic benefits derived from activities in the Area. . .on a non-discrimi-
natory basis ....
Id art. 140. Further, "[t]he Area shall be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes ....
Id art. 141. While the intent of the "peaceful purposes" article to prevent military uses and
abuses of the Area seems clear, whether the resources extracted from the Area are restricted to
peaceful purposes is unclear. The Convention provides no tracing mechanism to ensure that the
resources will be used for peaceful purposes. The nodules' constituent minerals, particularly co-
balt and manganese, have significant industrial uses and are also vital strategic minerals for
United States national defense. Whether the Convention would prohibit the use of deep-sea co-
balt in jet engines that power military aircraft, for example, is unclear. Further, whether the
Convention would prohibit the Third World from using the transfer payments for arms purchases
is also unclear. Presumably, these uses would not be prohibited by the terms of the Convention
itself, because Article 141 appears to cover only a case where the Area itself would be used as a
weapons storehouse or as a battleground. Id
248. Id arts. 1(I), 133, 134(1), 134(5). The "Area" is defined as "the sea-bed and ocean floor
and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Id art. 1(1).
249. Id art. 136.
250. Id art. 137.
251. Id art. 138.
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impose liability on noncomplying persons within its respective jurisdic-
tion.252 These provisions are obviously at odds with the Act. However,
until the United States ratifies the treaty, the Act is the supreme rele-
vant law and activities thereunder are not contrary to any existing con-
ventional or customary international law.253
The Convention requires that all appropriate and necessary steps
be taken to protect the marine environnent and human life.254 The
United States has been the leader in taking steps to effect these require-
ments. Indeed, the statutory and environmental regulations, in the Act
and elsewhere, on United States citizens engaged in deep seabed min-
ing are so comprehensive that the world community need not fear that
the United States will cause extensive environmental damage or will
inefficiently exploit ocean resources.
Another of Pardo's proposals that the Convention codifies is that
the Authority "shall take measures. . . to acquire technology and sci-
entific knowledge relating to activities in the Area; and. . . to promote
and encourage the transfer to developing States of such technology and
scientific knowledge so that all States Parties benefit therefrom, ' 255 and
that "[t]he effective participation of developing States in activities in
the Area shall be promoted. ' 256 No specific means of effecting these
goals are delineated in the Convention. The mining technology is pro-
prietary, belongs largely to private firms, and has taken many years and
enormous capital expenditures to develop. Whether the states with this
technology are willing or able to effect this transfer remains to be
seen-they may well balk at it. The Act itself does not provide a mech-
anism to effect this provision. Although article 144(2)(a) does state that
the transfer shall be "under fair and reasonable terms," the context in-
dicates that this provision is for the benefit of the developing nations in
acquiring the technology and does not provide for or require adequate
compensation for the technology owners. While the developed nations
might be willing to share the seabed-generated wealth, they may be
unwilling or legally unable to transfer the technology in the manner
envisaged by the Convention. An additional problem would be
whether the developing nations would actually have the expertise or
the resources for deep seabed mining, or the industrial, economic, and
252. See id art. 139.
253. See supra notes 233-42 and accompanying text.
254. Draft Convention, supra note 28, arts. 145-46.
255. Id art. 144(1).
256. Id art. 148.
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legislative frameworks to efficiently use the extracted minerals or the
transfer payments to improve economic conditions within their
borders.
Article 150 of the Convention provides policy guidelines under
which resource development in the Area is to be accomplished. 25 7 The
goals of international cooperation, a healthy world economy, and the
promotion of the interests of the developing nations are repeated, as
well as a more specific listing of objectives.25 8
Exploration and exploitation activities in the Area are to be organ-
ized and controlled by the Authority on behalf of all mankind. Activi-
ties in the Area may be carried out by state entities, natural or juridical
persons, or by "the Enterprise" (the Authority's business organ) by
means of a contract, following a form to be prescribed in the Conven-
tion's annex 111.29 Significantly, these contracts shall provide for se-
curity of tenure, being suspendable or terminable only in accordance
with requirements to be prescribed in annex 111.260 The Authority is
entitled to take any measures required to ensure compliance with the
Convention, including the right to inspect all mining facilities in the
257. Id art. 150. Activities are to be conducted in light of the following underlying policies:
The orderly, safe, and rational management of Area resources; the expansion of participation
opportunities; revenue participation by. the Authority; the promotion of just and stable prices re-
munerative to producers and fair to consumers that promote equilibrium between supply and
demand; the prevention of monopolies on Area activities; and the protection of developing coun-
tries from adverse impacts on their mineral export earnings; nondiscriminatory market access
preventing more favorable treatment of Area resources; and the development of the common heri-
tage for the benefit of all mankind. Id To effect these policies and the technology and revenue
transfers, the Authority must apply its powers without discrimination, while at the same time
giving "special consideration for developing States." Id art. 152.
To protect the markets and prices of the developing countries' mineral exports, article 151
provides for "production authorization" and complicated quotas on mineral production, In the
abstract, this article seems to prevent market play with respect to the prices of these vital minerals
and seems to protect the developing countries' cartel position. Keeping the prices high also causes
income transfers to these countries independently of the Convention. The "prices remunerative to
producers and fair to consumers" language of article 150 is subject to widely divergent interpreta-
tions, with the developing countries essentially asserting that market forces should not be allowed
to freely operate and assuming that the industrialized countries can pay whatever price the cartels
ask for their minerals. Eventually, this may backfire on the developing countries because the
artificially high prices may spur the development of alternatives. Further, without appropriate
Convention tracing mechanisms or domestic programs to ensure that these countries' peoples are
bettered by this influx of wealth, there is the possibility that only the rich and powerful will bene-
fit, and that the money will be diverted to military or political uses, rather than for the social
programs that might increase the standard of living in these countries.
258. Id art. 150.
259. Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Draft Convention, 35 U.N. GAOR Annex III,
Art. 13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3 (1980), reprinted in XI Nuw DIRECTIONS IN Tttf
LAw OF THE SEA 150 (M. Nordquist, K. Simmonds eds. 1981).
260. Id
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Area.26'
The Convention establishes a new international body to organize,
regulate, and enforce the Convention's provisions. Called the "Inter-
national Sea-bed Authority," all signatory states are ipso facto mem-
bers thereof, "based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
members. ' 262 The Authority is comprised of five principal organs: an
Assembly, a Council, a Secretariat, the Enterprise, and a Sea-Bed Dis-
putes Chamber.263
Each signatory is a member of the Assembly and each has one
vote therein.264 All decisions on substantive questions require a two-
thirds quorum majority.2 65 The Assembly is the Authority's supreme
organ, to which all others are accountable, and it has the power to es-
tablish general policies in conformity with the Convention. 6  This au-
thority includes the responsibility for determining the equitable sharing
of revenues and other economic benefits with the developing coun-
tries.2 67  The guidelines for performing this latter function are not
found in the Convention, but rather will be promulgated by the Au-
thority itself, functioning almost in the capacity of a supranational con-
gress with broad judicial, legislative, and administrative powers.
The Council will consist of thirty-six Authority members, each
serving four year terms and having one vote. Article 161 of the Con-
vention provides criteria for Council members to ensure proper repre-
sentation of all nations. 268  Factors such as geographic distribution,
261. Draft Convention, supra note 28, art. 153.
262. Id art. 157(3). See generally id arts. 156-57 (setting forth the general nature of the
Authority).
263. Id arts. 158(l)-(2), 187. Other subsidiary organs may be created as necessary. Id art.
158(3).
264. Id art. 159.
265. Id
266. Id art. 160. The Assembly also has the power to elect members of the Council, the
Secretary-General, and the Governing Board of the Enterprise; to establish any needed subsidiary
organs; to assess the contributions of members according to the scale used for the U.N. budget
until the Authority has sufficient income from other sources to meet its administrative expenses;
and to suspend members. Id
267. Id
268. Id art. 161(l). Representation on the Council is governed by the Convention as follows:
(a) Four members from the eight states which have the largest investment in min-
ing activities, including at least one Eastern European state;
(b) four members from those states which have either consumed at a rate greater
than two percent of the total world consumption, or have net imports of greater than two
percent of the total world imports of the nodules' constituent minerals, including at least
one Eastern European state;
(c) four members from those countries that are major net exporters of the nodules'
constituent minerals;
(d) six members from among developing nations, representing "special interests,"
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export/import rates, and consumption levels are considered. 269 Article
161's representational criteria, however, appear to be weighted against
the developed nations. Without including representation by Eastern
European socialist states, which do not yet have deep seabed mining
technology and would likely vote with the developing nation bloc, the
developed nations can place as few as six and, depending on the actual
interpretation of "geographic region" in Article 161(l)(e), as many as
eight, members on the Council.2 70 Thus, the developed states could be
outnumbered by as much as nine to one, enabling the developing na-
tions to dominate the Council by their numerical majority, even though
the success of this entire regime depends upon the private capital and
technology that only the developed nations can provide. Thus, the no-
tion of "sovereign equality" assures the Third World of perpetual con-
trol of the Council and all of its far-reaching functions.
The Council is the Authority's executive organ to supervise the
implementation of the Convention, possessing the power to establish
specific policies to be pursued by the Assembly.2 7' Control over all
Area activities is vested in the Council and it will recommend rules to
the Assembly for the distribution of revenue from deep seabed min-
ing.2 72 It can also recommend the suspension of privileges for gross
and consistent convention violations.273 Additionally, the Council can
enter into agreements with the United Nations or other international
organizations, subject to Assembly approval.2 74 Thus, the obvious con-
trol over the Assembly and Council by the Third World given by the
ie., land-locked or geographically disadvantaged states that are major mineral import-
ers, that are potential mineral producers, and that are the least developed;
(e) eighteen members elected according to an equitable distribution of Council
seats, with at least one from each "geographic region," ie., Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe,
Latin America, Western Europe, "and others."
Id
The Assembly must ensure that the election results provide reasonably proportionate repre-
sentation to land-locked, geographically disadvantaged, and coastal states that do not qualify
under (a) through (d) above. Id art. 161(2).
269. Id art. 161(l).
270. Id
271. Id art. 162(l)-(2)(a). The list described in the text is not all-inclusive. Additionally,
articles 163-64 establish two subsidiary organs for the Council: the Legal and Technical Commis-
sion and the Economic Planning Commission. These two organs, with fifteen members each, are
charged with the drafting of rules and regulations and the making of recommendations for Coun-
cil, and, derivatively, for Assembly action. No membership criteria are specified by the Conven-
tion, aside from the requirement that all nominees possess the requisite expertise pertaining to the
Commissions' functions.
272. Id art. 162(2)(k), (n).
273. Id art. 162(s).
274. Id art. 162(0.
[Vol. 18:207
48
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss2/2
MINING THE DEEP SEABED
Convention is significant considering the powers that are vested in
those bodies.
The Secretariat, the Authority's administrative organ, is comprised
of a Secretary-General, who serves a four year term, and other staff
that the Authority might require. 275 This staff is to consist of experts
meeting the highest standards of competence and will be recruited from
a wide geographical base.276 Except for its responsibility to the Au-
thority, the Secretariat will be wholly independent of any government
and its members must have no financial interest in any activities in the
Area.277 The Convention requires each state party "to respect the ex-
clusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-
General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge
of their responsibilities. 278
The Enterprise is the business organ of the Authority to carry out
activities in the Area, including the mining, transportation, processing,
and marketing of minerals.279 It is to acquire the expertise to engage in
these activities through the transfer of technology and scientific knowl-
edge from the developed states, as proposed by article 144(2). Specific
activities of the Enterprise will be established and controlled by the
Council.
The Authority will be funded by assessed contributions from the
states parties, revenue transfers from the Enterprise, receipts from Area
activities, loans, and voluntary state contributions.280  The annual
budget will be prepared by the Secretary-General and passed along to
the Assembly for approval upon the Council's recommendations.2 8'
The contributions received pursuant to article 171(a) will be used to
meet the Authority's administrative expenses, which have first priority
on the budget, until it has sufficient income from other sources. After
administrative expenses have been paid, the remaining funds will be
equitably distributed for the "benefit of all mankind," to provide the
Enterprise with revenue, and to assist and compensate developing
275. Id art. 166. Article 169 authorizes the Secretary-General to make any suitable arrange-
ments, subject to Council approval, for consultation and cooperation with international and non-
governmental organizations recognized by the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council. Id art. 169.
276. Id art. 167.
277. Id art. 168(1), (2).
278. Id art. 168(1).
279. Id art. 170(1).
280. Id art. 171. The Authority's borrowing power is to be exercised by the Council. Id art.
174.
281. Id art. 172.
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states who suffer adverse economic effects from a reduction in the price
of minerals they mine and export because of deep seabed mining
activities.2 82
The Authority will enjoy an international legal personality and
will have immunity from legal process, search and seizure, and from
any type of regulations or taxation.283 Representatives of states attend-
ing Authority meetings will also enjoy immunity from legal process in
the exercise of their functions and from immigration restrictions, alien
registration requirements, and national service obligations. 28 4 Author-
ity archives, all proprietary data, and industrial secrets are to be
"inviolable. 285
A state that is two years in arrears in financial contributions to the
Authority will suffer the suspension of its voting rights unless the fail-
ure to pay is due to conditions beyond the state's control.286 Gross and
persistent violations of the Convention's pertinent provisions can also
result in a guilty state's suspension by the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber.287
The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber is the Authority's judicial organ.
The Chamber is given jurisdiction over interpretative, contractual, in-
terstate, and state-Authority disputes.288  These disputes may also be
heard by a special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, an ad hoc chamber of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, or
may be submitted to binding arbitration.289 However, the Chamber
does not have jurisdiction over the exercise by the Authority of its dis-
cretionary powers and in no case may the Chamber substitute its dis-
cretion for the Authority's. 2 90  The Chamber may render advisory
opinions, "as a matter of urgency," when so requested by the Assembly
or the Council.29'
282. Id art. 173; see arts. 140, 160(2)0) (equitable distribution of funds); art. 170(4) (funding
the Enterprise); arts. 151(4), 160(2)(1) (economic assistance to mineral exporting states, probably
in the form of mineral price subsidies).
283. Id arts. 176-.80, 183.
284. Id art. 181.
285. Id art. 182.
286. Id art. 184. In order for an entity to be found to be in arrears, the amount owed by the
party must equal or exceed the contribution due from it in the two prior years. Id
287. Id art. 185.
288. Id art. 187.
289. 1d art. 188.
290. Id art. 190.
291. Id art. 189.
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3. The Cost of Failure at UNCLOS III
The Convention comprehensively codifies, without exception, the
demands of the developing countries. Their unwillingness to compro-
mise, a controlling factor due to their overwhelming numbers, stalled
progress at UNCLOS III.
Perhaps the thoroughness of the Convention is the greatest imped-
iment to its conclusion. The lumping together of so many highly
charged issues, especially those pertaining to navigation, fishing zones,
and massive wealth and technology transfers, has probably prevented
the Convention's speedy conclusion. Some provisions are clearly unde-
sirable from a strategic and national security viewpoint. Delay and dis-
agreement by the superpowers over these provisions may cause the
more desirable provisions to languish.
If the UNCLOS III process fails, some of the rules it attempted to
codify will revert to their status as customary international law. Never-
theless, the important North-South dialogue will be impaired and some
developing nations may resort to such economic reprisals as resource
boycotts.292 Further, some states, particularly developing ones, might
unilaterally extend their offshore jurisdictional claims in an attempt to
impair the existing traditional freedom of the high seas.293 There is
also a risk of increased superpower rivalry over the deep seabed, al-
though the Soviet Union does not yet have the technological compe-
tence to mine the ocean floor. Finally, the lack of a uniform, central
management authority may lead to the irreparable damage of the
marine environment and to the inefficient use of seabed resources.294
The UNCLOS III process is a laudable one, forcing the world to recog-
nize the need for cooperative management and conservation of finite
resources. However, the political and ideological bickering, largely by
the Group of 77, has detracted from meaningful negotiation. This dis-
sension has caused many to overlook the common interests that exist in
acquiring the knowledge and technology needed to develop the deep
seabed. Whether these conflicts have irreparably harmed the process
itself remains to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION
The commercial recovery of manganese nodules is of great con-
292. But see Alexander, Cameron & Nixon, supra note 224, at 22.
293. See id at 17-20.
294. See id at 17.
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cern to the economy and national security of the United States. Cur-
rently, the supplies of vital strategic minerals which will eventually be
recoverable from the seabed are available almost exclusively from very
unstable Third World countries, from which the United States obtains
virtually its entire supply, often at cartel prices. Such dependence
raises the possibility of economic and political duress. Commercial ac-
cess to the ocean's vast, renewable supply of nodules will enable the
United States to diminish its dangerous reliance on foreign suppliers.
Under the current domestic and international environmental regu-
latory regime, ample safeguards exist to protect the marine environ-
ment. Coupled with strong administrative oversight and enforcement,
the risks to the marine environment from commercial developments
are substantially minimized. Eventually, the need for additional pro-
tective measures to combat currently unforeseen harms may be demon-
strated, but in many instances the danger to the environment stems
from mining or processing methods for which the technology does not
yet exist. Therefore, the prudent course would be to promulgate envi-
ronmental protection regulations as that technology emerges and as the
mining becomes economically feasible.
The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act allows deep seabed
mining companies to prepare for commercial recovery activities, sub-
ject to the terms of UNCLOS III when and if it is concluded and rati-
fied. The companies are also subject to any treaty based on the
reciprocating states principle295 and to the Act's own cut-off date.296
After that date, deep seabed mining on a commercial scale may pro-
ceed provided no treaties are in effect with respect to the United States.
The Act itself is not a repudiation of the common heritage of man-
kind principle. Rather, it specifically embodies the essential principles
found in the UNCLOS III draft Convention. For instance, the Con-
vention's provisions involving the distribution of wealth are reflected in
the Act by the establishment of the Trust Fund. Nevertheless, the Act
assures nondiscriminatory access to the nodule fields by American min-
ing companies. Such access is important, given the nature of the power
that UNCLOS III wishes to bestow upon the Authority and the under-
representation of the developed countries on the Council. The Act is a
good faith showing that the United States is willing to unilaterally in-
295. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
296. See supra text accompanying note 199.
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corporate the basic principles that the UNCLOS III seeks to codify.
No other nation, not even those who criticize the United States for en-
acting the Act, has gone that far.
The rules and customary practices of international law do not bar
the commercial recovery of nodules. Arguably, such activity is within
the traditional freedom of the high seas and the res nullius principle.297
The assertion of the res communis and common heritage of mankind
theories essentially relate to the equitable sharing of the wealth gener-
ated by nodule recovery activities. Since the Act establishes a Trust
Fund to obtain and retain these revenues and because Congress intends
to make them available to the Authority, these assertions and criticisms
become virtually irrelevant.
A fundamental source of problems with the draft convention is its
attempt at comprehensiveness. It tries to codify virtually every custom-
ary practice and meld together most existing treaty law into one docu-
ment, while adding some new wrinkles to the law of the sea. There are
so many controversial provisions unrelated to the common heritage of
mankind principle that the ultimate conclusion and ratification of the
Convention is problematic. While the United States Senate recently
rejected the Convention, Third World pressure to conclude it will prob-
ably continue and the common heritage of mankind principle will
probably resurface in some form. Clearly, however, the developed na-
tions and particularly the United States will balk at ratifying the Con-
vention or its successor unless its interests are considered and protected.
The inadequate representation of these countries on the Council, cou-
pled with the total reliance on them for technology and investment cap-
ital and the total lack of protection or adequate compensation for such
technology and investment, presents one of the greatest anomalies in
the Convention, and is a substantial obstacle to its conclusion. While
these developed nations have shown a willingness to accommodate the
Group of 77's demands,298 they are unwilling to allow the creation of a
New World economic order that would be dominated by Soviet bloc
countries and the Group of 77. UNCLOS III should be used as a fo-
rum to reach a reasonable and fair result, rather than as an ideological
and political battleground. The Convention will not be ratified until
297. See supra text accompanying note 191.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 224-26.
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the interests of the owners of the technology and capital are considered,
protected, and adequately represented both in the theory of the interna-
tional law and in its practice.299
299. The Law of the Sea Treaty was signed on Dec. 10, 1982 by 118 nations. The United
States was one of 46 nations refusing to sign. Sea-Law Pact Is Signed By 118 Notions, But U.S.
and Others Don't Join, Wall. St. J., Dec. 13, 1982, at 30, col. 5.
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